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Date: /2013 Fifth Judicial District Court - Gooding County User: CYNT 
Time: 09:34 AM ROA Report 
Page 1 of 2 Case: CV-2013-0000084 Current Judge: John Butler 
Robert Terry Johnson, eta I., Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant 
Robert Terry Johnson, State Of Idaho, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant 
Date Code User Judge 
2/14/2013 NCPC CYNTHIA New Case Filed - 2nd Successive Petition for John Butler 
Conviction Relief 
APER CYNTHIA Subject: State Of Idaho Appearance Luverne E. John Butler 
Shull 
CYNTHIA Filing: H 10 - Post-conviction act proceedings John Butler 
Paid by: Johnson, Robert Terry (subject) Receipt 
number: 0000471 Dated: 2/14/2013 Amount: 
$.00 (Cash) For: Johnson, Robert Terry (subject) 
PETN CYNTHIA Petition and Affidavit for 2nd Successive Post John Butler 
Conviction Relief 
MISC CYNTHIA Supplement to 2nd Successive PCR - List of John Butler 
Exhibits in Support of Petition 
MOTN CYNTHIA Motion and Affidavit in Support of Appt of John Butler 
Counsel 
3/7/2013 MOTN CYNTHIA Ex Parte Motion to Extend Time John Butler 
3/12/2013 NOTC CYNTHIA Court's Notice of Intent to Dismiss John Butler 
MOTN CYNTHIA Amended Ex-Parte Motion to Extend time for John Butler 
Response 
3/13/2013 ORDR CYNTHIA Order Granting Ex Parte Motion to Extend time John Butler 
MISC CYNTHIA Objection to Ex-Parte Motion to Extend Time John Butler 
3/26/2013 ORDR CYNTHIA Order Granting Extension of Time to Respond John Butler 
3/29/2013 MISC CYNTHIA Petitioner's Response to Notice of Intent to John Butler 
Dismiss 
4/17/2013 MOTN CYNTHIA Ex Parte Motion for Order Clarifying Dates for John Butler 
State's Response 
4/18/2013 ORDR CYNTHIA Order Clarifiying Time for Response John Butler 
4/22/2013 ORDR CYNTHIA Order re: Appointment of Counsel John Butler 
ORPD CYNTHIA Subject: Johnson, Robert Terry Order Appointing John Butler 
Public Defender Court appointed Steven R 
McRae 
6/6/2013 MOTN CYNTHIA Motion for Extension of Time to Answer John Butler 
AFFD CYNTHIA Affidavit of Steven McRae John Butler 
ORDR CYNTHIA Order Granting Motion for Extension of Time to John Butler 
Answer 
7/3/2013 REPL CYNTHIA Petitioners Reply to Notice of Intent to Dismiss John Butler 
(includes Affidavit of Erik Lehtinen) 
AFFD CYNTHIA Affidavit of Robert Jones John Butler 
AFFD CYNTHIA Partial Supp Affidavit of Robert Johnson John Butler 
7/5/2013 SUPP CYNTHIA Supplemental Response by the Petitioner John Butler-
7/31/2013 MEMO CYNTHIA Memorandum Decision re Notice of Intent to John Butler 
Dismiss 
JDMT CYNTHIA Judgment of Dismissal John Butler 
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Case: CV-2013-0000084 Current Judge: John Butler 
Robert Terry Johnson, etal., Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant 
User: CYNT 
Robert Terry Johnson, State Of Idaho, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant 
Date Code User Judge 
7/31/2013 STAT CYNTHIA STATUS CHANGED: Closed John Butler 
CDIS CYNTHIA Civil Disposition entered for: Johnson, Robert John Butler 
Terry, Subject; State Of Idaho, Subject. Filing 
date: 7/31/2013 
8/1/2013 PETN CYNTHIA Petition to Declare Petitioner a Vexatious Litigant John Butler 
8/8/2013 MISC CYNTHIA Objection to Petition to Declare Petitioner a John Butler 
Vexatious Litigant 
8/14/2013 MOTN CYNTHIA Motion to Reconsider/Request Opportunity to John Butler 
Respond 
8/20/2013 MOTN CYNTHIA Motion for Appointment of Counsel John Butler 
AFFD CYNTHIA Affidavit in Support of Motion John Butler 
MOTN CYNTHIA Motion to Extend Time to Respond John Butler 
8/26/2013 MISC CYNTHIA Objection to the Petitioners Motion for John Butler 
Appointment of Counsel 
8/27/2013 ORDR CYNTHIA Order Denying Motion for Reconsideration John Butler 
9/9/2013 APSC CYNTHIA Appealed To The Supreme Court John Butler 
STAT CYNTHIA STATUS CHANGED: Inactive John Butler 
MOTN CYNTHIA Motion for Appointment of SAPD John Butler 
9/10/2013 ORDR CYNTHIA Order Apopinting SAPD on Appeal John Butler 
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P. 0. Box 86/624 Main Street Gooding, Idaho 83330 
Telephone (208) 934-4493 Facsimile (208) 934-4494 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF GOODING 
ROBERT JOHNSON, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
CASE NO. CV-2013-84 
ANSWER 
COMES NOW, the State of Idaho, by and through Luverne E. Shull, Gooding County 
Prosecuting Attorney, and does hereby answer Robert Johnson's Second Successive Petition for 
Post-Conviction Relief in the above-entitled action as follows: 
I. 
GENERAL RESPONSES TO ROBERT JOHNSON'S POST-CONVICTION ALLEGATIONS 
All allegations made by Robert Johnson are denied by the state unless specifically 
admitted herein. 
IL 
SPECIFIC ANSWERS TO ROBERT JOHNSON'S POST-CONVICTION ALLEGATIONS 
1. The State admits that the Petitioner is in custody at the Idaho Correctional Center. 
2. The State admits that the name and location of the court which imposed the Petitioner's 
judgement/sentence is the Fifth District Court, Gooding, Idaho. 
3. a. The State admits the case number for which sentence was imposed is 4367. 
ANSWER-I 
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b. The State admits that the Offenses the Petitioner was convicted of were two counts of 
first degree murder. 
4. a. The State admits that the date the Petitioner's sentence was imposed was October 2I5\ 
1994. 
b. The State admits the terms of the Petitioner's sentence were two terms of fixed life. 
5. The State admits that a finding of guilty was made after pleas to both counts of first degree 
murder. 
6. The State admits that the Petitioner did not appeal from the judgement of conviction or the 
imposition of sentence. The State also acknowledges that by the terms of the Rule 11 Plea 
Agreement and Acceptance the Petitioner waived his right to appeal the judgement and sentence. 
Petitioner alleges: 
"#1. Prosecution withheld evidence, a taped confession of Thomas Petersen, that 
would have proved that I did not willfully commit any crime and was actually a 
victim." 
7. Petitioner alleges that the prosecution withheld evidence, a taped confession of Thomas 
Petersen, that would have proved that the Petitioner has not committed a crime and was actually 
a victim. The State denies the allegation. The confessions of the Petitioner and his co-
defendant, Thomas Robert Petersen were extensively examined in open court at the preliminary 
hearing held October 22, 1993. Transcript p.20 and following. The taping of the interviews 
containing Thomas Petersen's confessions was disclosed and discussed in the Petitioner's 
presence at the preliminary hearing held October 22, 1993. Transcript pp. 89-92. 
Discovery responses reveal that complete transcripts of the interviews of both defendants were 
provided to both defendants' attorneys November 17, 1993, well before the Rule 11 Plea 
Agreement June 24, 1994. See the Acknowledgment of Discovery, dated November 17, 1993, 
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by Craig D. Hobdey, and State's Response to Discovery, dated November 17, 1993, signed by 
Philip A. Brown. 
Petitioner's claim that Thomas Robert Petersen harmed him the night of the murders, the 
Petitioner's claims that he feared people his co-defendant Thomas Robert Petersen might 
influence against him, and Petitioner's wish for witness protection were all out in the open at the 
preliminary hearing held October 22, 1993. Transcript p. 42, 70-71. 
Mr. Robert Terry Johnson's Defense Counsel's Sentencing Memorandum dated September 20, 
1994, provides: 
Mr. Johnson has contended all along that he voluntarily accompanied Mr. 
Peterson into the house, helped tie up Rick Mangum, and had anal intercourse 
with Connie Allen. Furthermore, Mr. Johnson has admitted from the outset that 
he did nothing to stop Mr. Peterson. It was Mr. Johnson who eventually told the 
police what had happened, even though Peterson threatened him, in the presence 
of others, with death ifhe "snitched". 
Robert Terry Johnson's Defense Counsel's Sentencing Memorandum, September 20, 1994, page 
4. 
Petitioner alleges: 
"#2. New Evidence in the form of a signed and notarized affidavit of Thomas 
Petersen stating unknown facts that would have supported my original criminal 
defense and stopped me from entering into a plea agreement to save my life from 
the Death Penalty." 
8. Petitioner alleges there is new evidence in the form of a confession by Thomas Petersen 
stating facts that were unknown to the Petitioner that would have stopped Petitioner from a plea 
agreement and proved the Petitioner's innocence. The Petitioner is one of two living people that 
were present when the murders occurred and cannot now be surprised and disadvantaged by any 
alleged conspiracy against him. These issues would have been present at the time of the crimes 
and/or prior to his plea negotiations and pleas of guilty. Therefore, these issues are all untimely. 
Now, Petitioner contends that he only engaged in criminal behavior because he had to or his co-
defendant would have murdered him. Any necessity defense should have been intimatelyknown-
230 
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to Petitioner and trial counsel from the very beginning because only Petitioner and his co-
defendant were aware of what really happened. Any such issue was timely then, and even for 
the sake of argument assuming Petitioner has lately come into additional evidence confirming 
facts Petitioner was aware of then, and the State does not concede that point, this Petition is 
untimely. See also the response to paragraph 7. supra. Further, Petitioner waived any necessity 
defense when he entered his guilty plea, and waived his right to appeal. Except for the above 
response the State does not have sufficient information to form a belief as to the truth of this 
allegation, and therefore denies the allegation, reserving the right to amend this answer upon 
further investigation. 
Petitioner alleges: 
"#3. Ineffective assistance of Counsel by S. Swensen, who also withheld 
information about the withheld taped confession of Thomas Petersen and the 
coverup that insued." 
Petitioner also alleges: 
"S. Swensen knew of the taped confession of Thomas Petersen and knew that the 
Prosecutor was withholding the tape and the information on it. Swensen knew 
that Peterson threaten to kill me if I did not do what he (petersen) said. Swensen 
did not inform me or the Court of his knowledge of the tape recording, and the 
information on it, adding to the conspiracy to hide evidence." 
9. Petitioner alleges ineffective assistance of counsel, by Severt Swenson, m original Post 
Conviction, Gooding County Case No. CV 1995-803, (previously designated SP-95-00196) for 
withholding information/evidence and conflict of interest. Petitioner's first petition for post 
conviction relief largely dealt with allegedly unkept promises and attempted to throw out 
Petitioner's confession as coerced by the Prosecution's underhandedness. 
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Any conflict issue between Mr. Swenson and Petitioner should have been readily apparent to 
Petitioner at the time of his first Petition for Post Conviction Relief and the time to deal with any 
such conflict was during the course of that proceeding. The Register of Actions reveals that the 
dismissal of the first Petition for Post Conviction Relief was not appealed. The State denies that 
petitioner received ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel in any way at any stage of 
the proceedings in Gooding County Case No. SP-95-00196, Petitioner's first Post Conviction 
Relief case. Further, the State answers that petitioner's allegation is not a cognizable claim. 
Idaho Code § 19-4904 provides no absolute right to counsel during post-conviction. Except for 
the above response, the State does not have sufficient information to form a belief as to the truth 
of this allegation, and therefore denies the allegation, reserving the right to amend this answer 
upon further investigation. Even if every allegation of Petitioner against counsel were true, 
Petitioner cannot show he was prejudiced under the second prong of Strickland v. Washington, 
466 U.S. 688 (1984). 
Petitioner alleges: 
"#4. Ineffective assistance of Counsel by David Heida for not filing an amended 
Successive Post Conviction as he stated that he was going to. 
#5. Inffective assistance of Counsel by David Heida for not presenting 
information/evidence pretaining to the arguments of the State on 
timeliness of the filing of the Successive Post Conviction Petition, 
once they were brought to his attention. 
#6. Ineffective assistance of Counsel by David Heida for not conducting 
Discovery that he claimed he would do. 
#7. Ineffective assistance of Counsel by David Heida for delaying Discovery and 
obtaining affidavits too late to file before a known court date. 
ANSWER-5 I 
v 
#8. District Court error in not having a hearing on filed motions by the Petitioner 
that were at the heart of the issues before the Court pretaining to the Summary 
Dismissal that the Court was deciding on. Petitioner was trying to correct errors 
by his counsel before the Court made a ruling." 
Petitioner also alleges: 
"David Heida deceived me into believing he was going to file an amended 
Successive Post Conviction, that I asked him to do, to fix fundamental errors from 
my filed Petition, especially dealing with the length of time it took me to file, 
which is the heart of the reasoning for the Summary Dismissal. He claimed, in 
writing, to be actively conducting a Discovery ( obtaining Medical Records, 
affidavits, and depositions) which he failed to do. I told him about why it took me 
so long to file and the people that could write affidavits on my efforts to figure 
out what to file and how to file in Court about the new evidence suddenly 
presented to me by Thomas Petersen. Mr. Heida also failed to present facts that I 
pointed out to him, in writing and in phone conversations, that pointed to the facts 
about the missing tape (that a law enforcement officer testified that the tape was 
missing, that the other tapes were already transcribed and in his possession, and 
that he himself had possession of it at one time). Mr. Heida failed to inform the 
Court of any facts the record showed that I told him about." 
The State denies that petitioner received ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel in any 
way at any stage of the proceedings in Gooding County Case No. CV 2009-399. Mr. Heide 
requested the opportunity to conduct discovery. (ROA 9/14/2009). The State objected to Mr. 
Heide's request to conduct discovery and filed a memorandum in opposition to the motion to 
conduct discovery. (ROA 9/25/2009). Further, the State answers that petitioner's allegations are 
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not cognizable claims. Idaho Code § 19-4904 provides no absolute right to counsel during post-
conviction. Except for the above response, the State does not have sufficient information to 
form a belief as to the truth of these allegations, and therefore denies the allegations, reserving 
the right to amend this answer upon further investigation. Even if every allegation of Petitioner 
against counsel were true, Petitioner cannot show he was prejudiced under the second prong of 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 688 (1984). 
Petitioner alleges: 
"#9. Ineffective assistance of Counsel by Erik Lehtinen for not raising issues on 
appeal about my filed motions before the District Court that were vacated for 
some unknown reason, which has information on maternal facts of my Petiton. 
#10. Ineffective assistance of Counsel of Erik Lehtinen for not presenting 
issues/facts/caselaw properly in front of the Court." 
Petitioner also alleges: 
"Erik Lehtinen failed to bring up that I tried by filing motions in District Court, to 
correct errors of my appointed attorney, that would have assisted my petition, and 
could have saved the Courts much time and effort. Mr. Lehtinen also admitted to 
me on the phone that a Idaho Supreme Court Justice told him that he failed' to 
present the issues on timeliness properly before the Court and even called him a 
liar." 
Answering the allegations against Mr. Lehtinen, the state admits that the Petitioner was provided 
counsel but denies the conclusory allegations, and as to the assertions of ineffective assistance of 
counsel, the state denies the allegations. Even if every allegation of Petitioner against counsel 
were true, Petitioner cannot show he was prejudiced under the second prong of Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 688 (1984). 
ANSWER- 7 
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In response to Petitioner's allegations in his "Response to Notice of Intent to Dismiss," filed 
March 29, 2013, that "[t]his Court is also using this Notice ofintent to Dismiss as a cover-up of 
the Gooding County Prosecutor's lies in his Ex-Parte Motion to Extend Time to Respond .... " 
(at page 6). 
The State denies the Petitioner's conclusory allegations. The March 12, 2013 "Amended Ex-
Parte Motion to Extend Time For Response" corrected the March 6, 2013 "Ex-Parte Motion to 
Extend Time For Response." 
FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Robert Terry Johnson's petition fails to state any grounds upon which relief can be granted. 
Idaho Code§ 19-4901(a); I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6). 
SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
To the extent Robert Terry Johnson's claims should have been raised on direct appeal, the claims 
are procedurally defaulted. Idaho Code § 19-4901(b). Further, the claims were waived by 
agreement. 
THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Robert Terry Johnson has failed to file his petition within the one year statute of 
limitation and the claims are now time-barred. Idaho Code§ 19-4902(a). 
FOURTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Robert Terry Johnson's Petition for Post-Conviction Relief contains bare and conclusory 
allegations unsubstantiated by affidavits, records, or other admissible evidence, and therefore 
fails to raise a genuine issue of material fact. Idaho Code§§ 19-4902(a), 19-4903, and 19-4906. 
FIFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
ANSWER-8 
Waiver, and/or issue preclusion, and/or collateral estoppel, and/or res judicata, and/or law 
of the case and /or laches apply and Petitioner is therefore estopped from alleging now that his 
confession prejudiced him. 
SIXTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Petitioner has filed a prior petition for post-conviction relief in state court. The State 
specifically raises a successive petition/res judicata/law of the case/procedural default bar. Idaho 
Code§ 19-4908. 
WHEREFORE, Respondent prays for relief as follows: 
a) That Robert Johnson's claims for post-conviction relief be denied; 
b) That Robert Johnson's claims for post-conviction relief be dismissed; 
c) for such other and further relief as the court deems necessary in the case. 
DATEDthis»dayofApril,~ ,:(_, &i-4 
Luverne E. Shull 
Gooding County Prosecuting Attorney 
VERIFICATION 
The Respondent, by and through Luverne E. Shull, being first duly sworn under oath, 
deposes and says: 
1) I am the attorney for the Respondent in the above-entitled matter. 
2) That the facts contained in the foregoing Answer to Petitioner's Petition for Post-
Conviction Relief are true and correct to the best of my information and belief. 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 2,5"Jl day of April, 2013, I caused a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing ANSWER to be placed in the United States mail, postage prepaid, 
addressed to: 
ANSWER-II 
Robert Johnson #27073 
ICC/H210B 
P.O. Box 70010 
Boise, ID 83707 
Steven McRae 
Attorney at law 
121 3rd Avenue East 
Jerome, Idaho 83338 
X U.S. Mail 
Hand Delivered 
---
---
Overnight Mail 
X U.S. Mail 
Hand Delivered 
---
OF IDAHO ) 
) ss: 
County of Gooding ) 
I hereby certify that on this 2~ day of April, I personally appeared before me. Luverne 
E. Shull, who, being first duly sworn, declared that he is representing the Respondent in this 
action, and that the statements contained in the foregoing document are believed to be true to the 
best of my information and belief. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed my official seal on 
the day and year first above written. 
TRACEY MARTIN 
Notary Public 
State of Idaho 
ANSWER-IO 
Notary Public for Idaho 
Residing at: UM.,...-6 Ct?, Idaho 
My Commission Expires: ~/~u 
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Steven R McRae [!SB No. 7984] 
McRAE LAW OFFICE, PLLC 
P.O. Box 1233 
Twin Falls, ID 83303-1233 
Telephone No. (208) 944-0755 
Facsimile No. (208) 736-0041 
e-mail: SMcR.ae@Magic Valley Legal.com 
Attorney for Petitioner 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF 
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF GOODING 
ROBERT JOHNSON, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Case No. CV-2013-84 
PETITIONER'S REPLY TO NOTICE 
OF INTENT TO DISMISS 
COMES NOW, Petitioner, Robert Johnson, by and through his attorney ofrecord, Steven 
R. McRae of McRae Law Office, PLLC, and files this Reply to the Court's Notice of Intent to 
Dismiss (the "Notice of Intene') (the "Reply•'). In the Notice of Intent, the Court sets forth 
reasoning to dismiss Petitioner's Petition and Affidavit for rd Successive Post-Conviction Relief 
(the "Petition"). This Reply is supported by the Affidavit of Robert Richard Jones, the Affidavit 
of Robert ""Johnson, and llie -:4fjiaavit oJ ErikLehtinen~·-·· ·-· ............. -- ---- •••·---~M. ---
Herein, Petitioner sets forth why his claims must be allowed to proceed. Petitioner 
asserts herein that he has set forth enough evidence in his Petition so as to survive dismissal 
pursuant to Idaho Code § 19-4906(b). and Petitioner seeks this Court to direct that the 
PETITIONER'S REPLY TO NOTICE OF INTENT TO DISMISS - l 
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proceedings should continue pursuant to Idaho Code § 19-4906(b ). Petitioner further asks that 
the appointment of Steven R. McRae be expanded to allow Mr. McRae the ability to propose an 
amended petition under the guidance provided herein pursuant to Idaho Code § 19-4906(b ), with 
at least four (4) weeks to prepare the same. Petitioner seeks oral argument on this matter. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURE 
On June 24, I 994, Petitioner entered pleas of guilty to two counts of felony murder 
pursuant to plea negotiations whereby the State would not seek the death penalty. On September 
21, 1994, Petitioner was sentenced to fixed life with no possibility of parole. Pursuant to his plea 
agreement, Petitioner did not appeal his sentence. 
On November 30, 1995, Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief (the "1995 
Post-Conviction Petition"). In filing the 1995 Post~Conviction Petition, Petitioner had not 
individually prepared the documents for the case. Partial Supplemental Affidavit of Robert 
Johnson ("Johnson .Affidavit '1, at 2. Petitioner utilized the services of an Inmate Law Clerk that 
was provided to him at the Idaho Maximum Security Institution ("IMSI"), where Petitioner was 
incarcerated at the time. Id. 
Inmate Law Clerks, such as Robert Richard Jones, were utilized in IMSI to assist 
inmates, interalia, with their post-conviction matters. Affidavit of Robert Richard Jones ("Jones 
Affidavit") at 2. The Inmate Law Clerks would meet with inmates that had legal inquiries, 
including on topics of post-conviction. Id. After the meeting with an inmate, the Inmate Law 
Clerk would either provide advice to llie inmate, or the Inmate Law Clerk would draft the 
required legal documents for the inmate. Id. If the Inmate Law Clerk determined that he/she 
would draft the required legal documents for the inmate, it was often normal practice that the 
PETITIONER'S REPLY TO NOTICE OF INTBNTTO DISMISS- 2 • 
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Inmate Law Clerk prepared the legal documents with very little involvement from the inmate. 
Id. 
In preparing the 1995 Post-Conviction Petition, Petitioner met with the Inmate Law Clerk 
and explained his underlying criminal case. Johnson Affidavit, at 2. At that time, the Inmate 
Law Clerk explained to Petitioner that the Inmate Law Clerk could help Petitioner. Id. The 
Inmate Law Clerk took from Petitioner the documents that Petitioner had in regards to his 
underlying criminal case. Id. The Inmate Law Clerk prepared all of the documents for 
Petitioner's 1995 Post-Conviction Petition. Id. Petitioner did not prepare the documents for his 
1995 Post-Conviction Petition whatsoever, as he relied on the expertise of the Inmate Law Clerk. 
Id. The Inmate Law Clerk also assisted Petitioner in filing the 1995 Post-Conviction Documents 
with the Court in Gooding County. 
Petitioner's 1995 Post-Conviction Petition was summarily dismissed on June 13, 1996. 
Petitioner appealed the summary of dismissal of his petition. The Idaho Court of Appeals, in an 
unpublished opinion, affinned the dismissal of the petition for post-conviction relief. Johnson v. 
Stare, 1997 Unpublished Opinion No. 617 (July 10, 1997). The remittitur was filed with the 
District Court on August 11, 1997. 
Sometime in 2009, Thomas Peterson, the alleged co-defendant in Petitioner's underlying 
criminal case, handed Petitioner a notarized confession. Id. Such confession stated, in summary, 
that: (a) Petitioner was very drunk to the point of barely walking, and Mr. Peterson took charge 
anotlireatenea everyone, inclooing :Petffioii.er;-(6fMr.··reterso'i1completed the tying and cutting 
himself and threatened death to Petitioner if he did not help; (c) Mr. Peterson gave the 
information to the prosecutors and his defense attorneys during and after the investigation; and 
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(d) Mr. Peterson's defense attorneys told Mr. Peterson to place blame on Petitioner so as to avoid 
the death penalty. Id. at 2, and Exhibit A. 
At that time, Mr. Peterson also informed Petitioner that Mr. Peterson had confessed to the 
crimes that Petitioner was charged with and confessed that Petitioner was a victim on the night in 
question - which confession was on an audio tape - before Mr. Peterson and Petitioner were 
charged with the crime of murder as co-defendants. Id. at 2. Mr. Peterson further stated that he 
had confessed to his lawyers, including Severt Swenson. Id. Mr. Peterson also told Petitioner 
that Mr. Phillip Brown, the Gooding County Prosecutor at the time of Petitioner's underlying 
criminal case, knew that Petitioner was a victim the night that Mr. Peterson committed the 
murders and that Mr. Peterson had made an agreement with Mr. Swenson and Mr. Brown to 
point the finger at Petitioner to save Mr. Peterson from facing the death penalty. Id. at 3. 
Petitioner was unaware of the information, including the existence of a confession on an audio 
tape, until Mr. Peterson gave Petitioner the notarized confession and stated the information. Id. 
As soon as Petitioner could, he made an effort to contact the paralegal at the Idaho 
Correctional Center ("ICC"), where he was incarcerated at the time, and Petitioner inquired how 
to proceed with the new information. Id. At that time, Petitioner was aware that ICC no longer 
employed Inmate Law Clerks. Id. 
While Petitioner waited for the paralegal to allow his inquiry, Petitioner contacted his 
aunt, Karen Devine, as soon as he could. Id. Petitioner asked his aunt to help find him an 
attorney thatcould helpPetitioner determine now to procee<fwiththe new information fromMr. ---········-····-
Peterson. Id. Petitioner's aunt provided Petitioner with addresses of attorneys for Petitioner to 
contact. Id. As soon as Petitioner was able, he wrote letters to all of the attorneys whose 
addresses Petitioner's aunt provided. Id. 
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After Petitioner was able to meet with the paralegal at ICC, the paralegal informed 
Petitioner that he was not an attorney and could not give Petitioner advice on what to do or how 
to proceed. Id. 
Only one attorney replied to Petitioner's letter, Dennis Benjamin. Id. Petitioner spoke 
with Mr. Benjamin on the telephone as soon as he was able and allowed to do the same. Id. Mr. 
Benjamin told Petitioner that the proper way to use the new information was to file another post-
conviction petition. Id. Until his conversation with Mr. Benjamin, which was in May of 2009. 
Petitioner was unaware that the proper procedure to use the information was to file another post-
conviction petition. Id. at 4. Also, Petitioner was unaware that he had the legal ability to file a 
subsequent post-conviction petition after filing his 1995 Post-Conviction Petition. Id. 
At his next available time, Petitioner again visited the paralegal of ICC and requested a 
packet of documents for post-conviction petitioners. Id. Petitioner completed the work on the 
post-conviction papers, which took considerable time, despite Petitioner's best efforts to 
complete the packet. Id. It took weeks for Petitioner to request the packet, receive the packet, 
fill out the information needed in the packet. request an appointment to make copies of the 
packet, request an appointment in ICC for notary services and to mail out the completed packet. 
Id. 
On July 29, 2009, Petitioner filed his Successive Petition for Post-Conviction Relief (the 
"2009 Post-Conviction Petition"), in which Petitioner alleged. in part, that the State had withheld 
exculpatory evictence in the form of statements of Mr. PeterSon that exonerated Petitioner from 
involvement in the murders. 
The State filed a Motion for Summary Dismissal based upon the merits and on the basis 
that the petition was untimely. Petitioner informed his attorney on the 2009 Post-Conviction 
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Petition. David Heida, of the facts as contained above in in regards to the process of filing both 
his 1995 Post-Conviction Petition and the 2009 Post-Conviction Petition. Id. Mr. Heida did not 
use the information in representing Petitioner in the 2009 Post-Conviction Petition in combatting 
the argument that the 2009 Post-Conviction Petition should be dismissed as untimely. Id. The 
2009 Post-Conviction Petition was dismissed by the District Court on the merits and also on the 
basis that the 2009 Post-Conviction Petition was untimely. 
Petitioner's case was transferred to the Idaho State Appellate Public Defender's Office 
("SAPD"), where Erik Lehtinen represented Petitioner. Ajfidavif of Erik R. Lehtinen ("Lehtinen 
Affidavit"), at 1. Mr. Lehtinen noted in his representation that Petitioner's counsel, David Heida 
and Isaac Keppler, never made a record of why it took Petitioner approximately four months to 
file the 2009 Post-Conviction Petition. Id. at 3. However, Mr. Lehtinen did not perceive the 
timeliness challenge as credible, and therefore only cursorily addressed it in his briefing. Id. at 
3-4. The briefing from the State at the appellate level was primarily directed at the issue of 
timeliness. Id. at 4. The State primarily argued that Petitioner had failed to make a factual 
showing of the unique facts of the case and why Petitioner had filed his petition within a 
"reasonable time". Id. at 4-5. 
Mr. Lehtinen regretted that he did not have a record of the specific reasons why it took 
Petitioner approximately four months to file his successive petition and made the · alternate 
arguments that 1) four (4) months simply was a "reasonable time" for an indigent, incarcerated 
prose petitioner to file a successfoepetfffon-ancr2ra·'"reasonabie time" standard in n()n-cap:ffac·--·- ····-----
cases should be defined in terms of usual statute of limitation in non-capital post-conviction 
cases ( of one year). Id. at 6. The Court of Appeals affinned the dismissal of the 2009 Post-
Conviction Petition solely on the basis that it was untimely filed and did not address the merits of 
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Petitioner's 2009 Post-Conviction Petition. Johnson v. State. 2011 Unpublished Opinion No. 
574 (August 8, 201 l). Mr. Lehtinen believes that the Court of Appeals may have reached a 
different conclusion had Petitioner had a better record detailing the specific reasons why the 
2009 Post-Conviction Petition was not filed until approximately four months after his discovery 
of the Brady evidence / violation. Id. at 8. 
Mr. Lehtinen filed a timely petition for review with the Idaho Supreme Court, in which 
he argued that review should be granted in order for the Supreme Court to resolve the question 
left unanswered by Pizzuto - whether the "reasonable time" standard in non-capital cases should 
be defined in terms of usual statute of limitations in non-capital post-conviction cases. i.e., one 
year. Id. at 8. The Supreme Court granted review. Id. The State argued, interalia, that the 
Supreme Court's grant of review should be withdrawn as improvidently granted because 
Petitioner had, in the original Appellant's Brief, "advocated for application of the case-by-case 
analysis of what constitutes a reasonable delay in asserting a newly discovered claim," and then 
changed his approach in his Reply Brief. "arguing for the first time that any delay less than one 
year was automatically reasonable." Id. After briefing against the State's brief, at oral argument 
in the matter, Mr. Lehtinen conceded that the Pizzuto case had not been cited in the opening 
brief. but made argument that it was nevertheless properly considered. Id. at 10. Ultimately, the 
Supreme Court entered an Order Dismissing Appellant's Petition for Review because '1ihe issue 
this Court initially wanted to address on review was not raised in Appellant's opening brief on 
review [sic] ... " (emphasis m origmair Id.-···--·-·-·-···--·····-·······-·-· 
Mr. Lehtinen concedes that had he presented the Pizzuto argument in petitioner's opening 
brief on appeal, "presumably the Supreme Court would not have dismissed the petition for 
review and. instead, would have reached the merits of the Pizzuto argument." Id. at 11. 
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DISCUSSION 
An application for post-conviction relief initiates a civil proceeding. Hall v. State, 151 
Idaho 42, 45 (2011 ). The summary dismissal of a post-conviction action is permissible when the 
petitioner fails to raise a genuine issue of material fact that, if resolved in his or her favor, would 
entitle the petitioner to the requested relief. Idaho Code § 19-4906; Murphy v. Stare, 143 Idaho 
139, 145 (Ct. App. 2006). 
A court may only dismiss a petition when there is no issue of material fact. Kirkland v. 
State, 143 Idaho 544, 546 (Idaho 2006). "Summary dismissal of an application pursuant to 
LC.§ J9w4906(b) is the equivalent of summary judgment under I.R.C.P. 56." Dunlap v. State, 
126 Idaho 901, 904 (Idaho App. 1995) (citing Ramirez v. State, 113 Idaho 87 (Ct. app. 1987) 
(emphasis added)). 
Like tlte plaintiff in a civil action, the applicant must prove by a 
preponderance of evidence the allegatiom upon wl,ich tl,e request for 
post-conviction relief is based. An application Jot post-conviction relief 
differs from a complaint in an ordinary civil action, however, for an 
application must contain much more than 'a short and plain statement of 
the claim' that would suffice for a complaint under I.R.C.P. 8(a)(I). 
Rather, an application for post-conviction relief must be verified with 
respect to facts within the personal knowledge of the applicant, and 
affidavits, records or other evidence supporting its allegations must be 
attached, or the application must state why such supporting evidence in 
not included with the petition. I.C. § 19-4903. 
Chouinard v. State, 127 Idaho 836,838 (Idaho App. 1995) (emphasis added). Thus, when there 
exists a material issue of fact, summary dismissal of a post-conviction petition is not warranted. 
dismissing the post-conviction petition was incorrect because there existed a material issue of 
fact as to the elements of the petitioner>s claim). 
As to successive post-conviction petitioners. Petitioner bears the burden to establish 
sufficient reason as to why the ground for relief was not asserted in his original petition or was 
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inadequately asserted in his original petitioner or that any waiver of an asserted claim was not 
knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently waived. LC. § 19-4908. As this Court has cited in the 
Notice of Intent, the Idaho Court of Appeals has stated in relation to successive post-conviction 
petitions: 
All grounds for relief available to an applicant undei· the UPCP A must be 
raised in an applicant's original, supplemental, or amended application. LC. 
§ l 9M4908. The language of Section 19-4908 prohibits successive 
application in those cases where the applicant "knowingly, voluntarily and 
intelligently" waived the grounds for relief sought in the successive 
application or offers "no sufficient reason'' for omitting those grounds in the 
original application. See Palmer v. Dermitt, 102 Idaho 591, 593, 635 P.2d 
955, 957 (1981). llowever, Section 19-4908 allows an applicant to raise a 
ground for relief, w/1ich was addressed in a former application, if he or 
she can demonstrate sufficient reason why that ground was inadequately 
raised or presented in tlte initial post-conviction action. See Hernandez v. 
Staret 133 Idaho 794, 798, 992 P.2d 789. 793 (Ct. App. 1999). An 
allegation that a claim was not adequately presented in the first post" 
conviction action due to the ineffective assistance of prior post-conviction 
counsel, if true, provides sufficient reason frl,r permitting issues that were 
inadequately presented to he presented in a subsequent application for 
post-conviction relie[. 
(Emphasis added). 
1. PETITIONER HAS ESTABLISHED SUFFICIENT FACTS TO SHOW THAT DAVID HEIDA 
PROVIDED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE AS PETITIONER'S COUNSEL IN PETITIONER'S 
2009 POST-CONVICTION PETITION IN FAILING TO ARGUE FACTS TO SHOW THAT 
PETITIONER TIMELY FILED THE 2009 POST-CONVICTION PETITION. 
Petitioner asserts that he has established sufficient facts yo avoid summary dismissal in 
his allegation that he received ineffective assistance of counsel from David Heida in his 2009 
Post-Conviction Petition1• To establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel so as to avoid 
--------·------
summary dismissal, Petitioner must show that there was a genuine issue of material fact on two 
elements: 1) that Petitioner's counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of 
reasonableness and 2) that there is a reasonable probability that, but for his counsel's errors. the 
1 Petitioner notes that below, in Section 3, Petitioner addresses the procedural application of Petitioner's claim of 
ineffective assistance of David Heida as counsel under the ruling in Palmer v. Dermitt. 
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result of the proceeding would have been different. See, generally. Strickland v. Washington, 
466 U.S. 668. 687-88 (1984). 
First, Mr. Heida's performance foll below an objective standard of reasonableness when 
he failed to assert a. factual basis - and thereby create a factual record - of Petitioner's process in 
filing his 2009 Post-Conviction Petition. Petitioner, in the least, has created a genuine issue of 
material fact in the same. Petitioner informed Mr. Heida of the factual basis in his filing of both 
his 1995 Post-Conviction Petition and the 2009 Post-Conviction Petition as is contained in the 
Johnson Affidavit and is described supra and infra. However, Mr. Heida never used said 
information to create a factual record to be the basis of an argument that Petitioner filed his 2009 
Post-Conviction Petition within a "reasonable time" as is described infra. It is clear that without 
this factual record, Petitioner could not make an argument on the "case-by-case" basis, as is 
described infra. Thus, it is clear that Mr. Heida fell below an objective standard of 
reasonableness because any competent counsel would have set forth a factual basis to justify 
Petitioner's filing of his 2009 Post-Conviction Petition. 
Second, there is a reasonable probability that, but for his counsel's errors, the result of the 
proceeding would have been different. In the very least, Petitioner has established a genuine 
issue ofma.terial fact in the same with the affidavits of Petitioner. Robert Richard Jones, and Erik 
Lehtinen. Charboneau v. State, 144 Idaho 900, 174 P.3d 870 (2007) sets forth the standard that 
when a successive petition for post-conviction is filed. the same must be filed within a 
~·reasonabletime''oftheaiscovery oflnformation tliat was not previousiyknown or coulo_n_o_t __ , __ _ 
have been known by the petitioner. The Court stated: 
In capital cases, this Court has required that successive petitions for post-
conviction relief be filed within a reasonable time. (Citation omitted). 
This "reasonable time" standard is not specifically stated in LC. § 19-
2719, which governs successive petitions in capital cases. Rather, the 
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reasonable time standard is based on this Court's construction of statutory 
language barring claims that a defendant knew or reasonably should have 
known within 42 days after judgment was filed. As the Court has 
construed I.C. § 19-2719, a defendant may bring claims that he did not 
know or could not reasonably have known so long as those claims are 
brought within a reasonable time ... The trial court's analysis of 
"sufficient reason" permitting the filing of a successive petition must 
necessarily include an analysis of whether the claims being made were 
asserted within a reasonable period of time. In determining what a 
reasonable time is for filing a successive petition, we will simply consider 
it on a case-by-case basis, as has been done in capital cases. 
Id. at 904-05, 174 P.3d at 874-75 (2007) (Emphasis added). 
Petitioner asserts that the facts as set forth herein and in the affidavits of Petitioner and 
Robert Richard Jones, shows that he filed his 2009 Post-Conviction Petition within a reasonable 
time, and had Mr. Heida argued the same, Petitioner would have thus survived a challenge of 
untimeliness from the State during his 2009 Post~Conviction Petition. The facts are as follows: 
1. Sometime in 2009, Thomas Peterson, the alleged co-defendant in Petitioner's underlying 
criminal case, handed Petitioner a notarized confession and provided Petitioner with the 
informati011 that was the basis for this 2009 Post-Conviction Petition. Johnson Affidavit 
at 2-3. As soon as Petitioner could, he made an effort to contact the paralegal at the ICC, 
where he was incarcerated at the time, and inquired how to proceed with the new 
information. Id. At that time, Petitioner was aware that ICC no longer employed Inmate 
Law Clerks (as was the case when he filed the 1995 Post-Conviction Petition, as 
described infra). Id . 
. --wliilePetiboner waitea-fortlie pamlegat··toalloW·liisinqiiizy;-Petitioner conta.aoo-Jiis 
aunt, Karen Devine, as soon as he could. Id. Petitioner asked his aunt to help find him 
an attorney that could help Petitioner determine how to proceed with the new information 
froni Mr. Peterson. Id. Petitioner's aunt provided Petitioner with addresses of attorneys 
for Petitioner to contact. Id. As soon as Petitioner was able, he wrote letters to all of the 
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attorneys whose addresses Petitioner's aunt provided. ld. After Petitioner was able to 
meet with the paralegal at ICC. the paralegal informed Petitioner that he was not an 
attorney and could not give Petitioner advice on what to do or how to proceed. Id. 
3. Only one attorney replied to Petitioner's letter, Dennis Benjamin. Id. Petitioner spoke 
with Mr. Benjamin on the telephone as soon as he was able and allowed. Id. Mr. 
Benjamin told Petitioner that the proper way to use the new information was to file 
another post-conviction petition. Id. Until his conversation with Mr. Benjamin, which 
was in May of 2009, Petitioner was unaware that the proper procedure to use the 
information was to file another post-conviction petition. Id. at 4. Also, Petitioner was 
unaware that he had the legal ability to file a subsequent post-conviction petition after 
filing his 1995 Post-Conviction Petition. Id. 
4. At his next available time. Petitioner again visited the paralegal of ICC and requested a 
packet of documents for post-conviction petitioners. Id. Petitioner completed the work 
on the post-conviction papers. which took some time, despite Petitioner's best efforts to 
complete the packet. Id. It took weeks for Petitioner to request the packet. receive the 
packet, fill out the infom1ation needed in the packet, request an appointment to make 
copies of the packet, request an appointment in ICC for notary services and to mail out 
the completed packet. Id. 
5. On July 29, 2009, Petitioner filed his Successive Petition for Post-Conviction Relief (the 
'2009 Post-Conviction Petition''), in wliicli '.Petitioner alleged, in part, that the State had 
withheld exculpatory evidence in the form of statements of Mr. Peterson that exonerated 
Petitioner from involvement in the murders. 
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All of the foregoing facts show that Petitioner was expeditious in seeking out infonnation 
on how to file the new information with the court, seeking out legal counsel, obtaining the 
required documents, filling out the documents while being restrained in his actions (from being 
in custody)i and filing the documents with the Court. Because of the expeditious manner in 
which he completed all of these acts. Petitioner has clearly demonstrated sufficient facts so as to 
survive summary dismissal - as there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Petitioner 
filed his 2009 Post-Conviction Petition within a "reasonable time'\ 
Furthennore, in the Notice of Intent, the Court infers that because Petitioner had filed the 
1995 Post-Conviction Petition, that he was thus familiar with the process and knew how to use 
the infonnation as was provided to him by Mr. Peterson. Thus, the Court concludes, "The 
petitioner, [sic] clearly new [sic] how to go about filing a petition for post~conviction relief." 
Notice of Intent at 8. However, upon review of the facts in this matter, this inference is not 
correct, or the Petitioner has at least raised a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the 
inference is incorrect. The facts supporting this conclusion are as follows: 
1. On November 30, 1995, Petitioner filed the "1995 PostwConviction Petition". In filing 
the 1995 Post-Conviction Petition. Petitioner had not individually prepared the 
docuroents for the case. Johnson Affidavit at 2. Petitioner utilized the services of an 
Inmate Law Clerk that was provided to him at the Idaho Maximum Security Institution 
("IMSI"), where Petitioner was incarcerated at the time. Id. 
2-. --In preparing tlie f9"93-Post-ConviciionPetHion, Petitioner met withtlie Inmate Law Clerl< 
and explained his underlying criminal case. Johnson Affidavit, at 2. At that time, the 
Inmate Law Clerk explained to Petitioner that the Inmate Law Clerk could help 
Petitioner. Id. The Inmate Law Clerk took form Petitioner the documents that Petitioner 
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had in regards to his underlying criminal case. Id. The Inmate Law Clerk prepared all of 
the documents for Petitioner's 1995 Post-Conviction Petition. Id. Petitioner did not 
prepare the documents for his 1995 Post-Conviction Petition whatsoever, as he relied on 
the expertise of the Inmate Law Clerk. Id. The Inmate Law Clerk also assisted Petitioner 
in filing the 1995 Post-Conviction Documents with the Court in Gooding County. Id. 
All of this was a regular practice and procedure of Inmate Law Clerks at that time. Jones 
Affidavit at 1-2. 
Petitioner clearly relied entirely on the Inmate Law Clerk in filing his 1995 Post-
Conviction Petition. Petitioner had only minimal involvement in filing the 1995 Post-Conviction 
Petition, and the Inmate Law Clerk handled the matter for him. In contrast, in 2009, Petitioner 
had virtually no person on whom to rely in helping him file a post~conviction petition. The 
paralegal at ICC offered him no advice. and Petitioner was completely on his own in determining 
how to proceed. These facts show a clear contrast in facts in the Petitioner's filing of his two 
separate post-conviction petitions. As such, Petitioner again asserts that he has raised sufficient 
facts to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the Court was correct in asserting that 
Petitioner was familiar with the post-conviction process and knew how to use the infonnation as 
was provided to him by Mr. Peterson. 
For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner asserts that he has established both prongs of 
proving ineffective assistance of counsel of David Heida in his 2009 Post-Conviction Petition 
and aslcs7liis Court to airect that the proceedings shoula-continue pursuant to Idaho Code § 19. 
4906(b). 
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2. PETITIONER HAS ESTABLISHED SUFFICIENT FACTS TO SHOW THAT ERIK LEHTINEN 
PROVIDED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE AS PETITIONER'S APPELLATE COUNSEL IN 
PETITIONER'S 2009 POST-CONVICTION PETITION IN FAILING TO CITE PIZZUTO IN 
THE OPENING BRIEF OF PETITIONER'S APPEAL. 
In the event that the Court does not find that Petitioner has alleged sufficient facts as to 
survive summary dismissal as to David Heida's representation of Petitioner in the 2009 Post-
Conviction Petition, Petitioner further alleges that Erik Lehtinen was ineffective as Petitioner's 
counsel on the appeal of 2009 Post-Conviction Petition. Mr. Lehtinen admits in his affidavit that 
he should have cited and argued Pizzuto in his opening brief on appeal. Lehtinen Affidavit 11. 
He also admits that because he did not do so, the Idaho Supreme Court denied the review of 
Petitioner's case. Id. He finally states, "As the Pizzuto argument is a meritorious one. which 
may have ultimately been adopted, and as the petition and [its] supporting material raised a 
genuine issue of material fact as to whether the State wrongfully withheld exculpatory evidence, 
there is a reasonable probability that the appeal would have turned out differently had I explicitly 
raised the Pizzuto argument in the opening brief on appeal." Id. 
Thus. Petitioner has raised at least a genuine issue of material fact as to whether he has 
satisfied the two prongs of Strickland in proving ineffective assistance of counsel, Mr. Lehtinen, 
at the appellate level of the 2009 Post-Conviction Case. 
3. TaE DOCTRIN£.S OF RES JtJDlCA'l'A ANO LAW OF TOE CASE DO NOT AP:VL:V ONl>ta 
THE RULING lN PAlMER V. DERMITT, W8lCH HAS BEEN FOLLOWEJ) NOMEROOS 
TIMES BY THE APPELLAT.& COURTS IN IDAHO. 
Petitioner in this matter must be allowed to proceed to seek a finality of the issues raised 
--------------------.. ··--··-· -··········-···· ·····--· 
in his 2009 Post-Conviction Petition under Palmer v. Dermitt, 102 Idaho 591, 593, 635 P.2d 955, 
957 (1981), which does not violate the doctrines of Res Judicata or Law of the Case. In Palmer, 
the Idaho Supreme Court considered allegations by Palmer that his original post-conviction 
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counsel was ineffective. which warranted his ability to bring again his post-conviction arguments 
until finality was reached on the issues of the arguments. Id. 
Under what the Court deemed the "finality rule", the Court allowed Palmer to reassert his 
arguments anew. The Court~ in considering the language of Idaho Code § 19-4908, related the 
words of the American Bar Association Standards Relating to Post-Conviction Remedies, which 
state, in part, "(ii) A question lias been fully and finally litigated when tire liigl,est court of tlie 
state to wliicl, a defendant can appeal as of right has ruled on the merits of the question. 
Finality is an affirmative defense to be pleaded and proved by the state. (b) Claims advanced 
in post-conviction applications should be decided on theit merits, even though they might have 
been, but were not, fully and finally litigated in the proceedings leading to the judgments of 
conviction... Id. (Emphasis added). The Court finally ruled: 
Tlie allegations of ineffective assistance of prior post~eonviction 
counsel, if true, would warrant a finding tltat lite omission in tlie 
prior post-conviction proceeding of the allegations now being 
raised anew by Palmer was not a result of an active, knowing 
choice made by Palmer tlirough tltis prior court-appointed 
attorney, and would therefore provide sufficient reason for 
permitting the newly asserted allegations to he raised in the 
instant petition. Other jurisdictions have similarly heW that a 
claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel or prior post-
conviction counsel provides sufficient reason to permit newly 
asserted allegations to be raised in a subsequent post-conviction 
proceeding. See Sims v. State, 295 N.W.2d 420 (Iowa 1980); 
Curtis v. State, 37 Md. App. 459, 381 A.2d 1166 (1978) rev'd on 
other grounds; Stewart v. Warden, Nevada State Prison, 92 Nev. 
588. 555 P.2d 218 (1976). 
Tcl. af59o.63YP:2aa:rw,o-09s1nEmpliasisaaaeaJ;-··········· ···· ·····-·--·----····--
It is important to note that in Palmer, the Idaho Supreme Court ruled that an issue on 
which Palmer had reached finality by taking through the appellate process - the felony 
impeachment rule-must be barred by the doctrine of the Law of the Case. Id. at 595,635 P.2d 
at 959 (1981 ). However, on the issues that Palmer was denied finality because his prior post-
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conviction counsel was ineffective, the Idaho Supreme Court ruled that the district court erred in 
summarily dismissing the issues (and did not render the issues warrantless under the doctrines of 
Res Judicata or Law of the Case). Id. at 596, 635 P.2d at 960 (1981). As such, the only logical 
inference is that the finality rule as set forth in Palmer - which allows a post-conviction 
petitioner to proceed on claims he has brought forth in a prior post-conviction petition - does not 
violate the principles of Res Judicata or Law of the Case. 
The finality rule in Palmer has been followed in other Idaho cases. See Hernandez v. 
State, 133 Idaho 794, 798, 992 P.2d 789, 793 (Ct. App. 1999); Baker v. Stare, 142 Idaho 411, 
420, 128 P.3d 948, 957 (Ct. App. 2005) ("An allegation that a claim was not adequately 
presented in the first post-conviction action due to the ineffective assistance of prior post-
conviction counsel, if true, provides sufficient reason for permitting issues that were 
inadequately presented to be presented in a subsequent application for post-conviction relief ... ); 
and Schwanz v. State, 145 Idaho 186, 189, 177 P.3d 400, 403 (a. App. 2008) ("failing to 
provide a post-conviction applicant with a meaningful opportunity to have his or her claims 
presented may be violative of due process.") Petitioner notes that the Court in this matter cited 
all of the above referenced cases in the Notice ofintent. See Notice of Intent, 4. 5. and 10. 
In this matter, Petitioner has set forth his argument that David Heida, his attorney on his 
2009 Post-Conviction Petition. was ineffective in failing to argue the facts and establish that 
Petitioner filed his 2009 Post-Conviction Petition within a "reasonable time" so as to survive 
summary dismissal as set forth supra. PUrsuant to Palmer, Petitioner seeks to reassert all of the 
grounds that were ruled to be untimely in his 2009 Post-Conviction Petition by the Idaho Court 
of Appeals, so as to seek finality of his claims on the merits. As such, Petitioner requests that the 
Court direct that the proceedings should continue pursuant to Idaho Code § 19-4906(b ). 
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Additionally, Petitioner has set forth his argument that Erik Lehtinen, his appellate 
attorney on his 2009 Post~Conviction Petition, was ineffective in failing to cite Pizzuto in 
Petitioner's opening appellate brief. In the event that the Court does not believe that Petitioner 
has adequately proven sufficient facts so as to survive summary dismissal on the timeliness issue 
- and that Mr. Heida provided ineffective assistance of counsel on the same - pursuant to 
Palmer, Petitioner seeks then to reassert all of the ground that were ruled to be untimely in his 
2009 Post-Conviction Petition by the Idaho Court of Appeals, so as to seek finality of his claims 
on the merits by being able to include an argument under Pizzuto that a "reasonable time'' 
standard in non-capital cases should be defined in terms of usual statute of limitations in non-
capital post-conviction cases, i.e., one year. As such. Petitioner requests that the Court direct 
that the proceedings should continue pursuant to Idaho Code § 19-4906(b ). 
Petitioner finally notes that his present counsel. Steven R. McRae, has not had an 
opportunity to prepare an amended petition or a motion to amend the petition in this matter, 
given his limited appointment as set forth in Order re: Appointment of Counsel filed on April 22, 
2013. As such, Petitioner requests that the Court allow Mr. McRae the ability to propose an 
amended petition under the guidance provided herein pursuant to Idaho Code § l 9-4906(b ), with 
at least four ( 4) weeks to prepare the same. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner requests that the Court, pursuant to Idaho Code § 
19-4906(6) direct tJ:iat the proceedings contii:iiie."'.P'etitioner]urtlier askstliat llie appointment of 
Steven R. McRae be expanded to allow Mr. McRae the ability to propose an amended petition 
under the guidance provided herein pursuant to Idaho Code§ 19-4906(b), with at least four (4) 
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weeks to prepare the same. Additionally; Petitioner requests an oral hearing on this matter for all 
issues raised. 
DATED this 3rd day of July, 2013. 
McRAE LAW OFFICE, PLLC 
By:~~---
Steven R. McRae 
Attorney for Petitioner 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 3rd day of July, 2013, I served a true and correct copy 
of the within and foregoing document upon the following: 
Gooding County Prosecutor 
P.O. Box 86 
Gooding, ID 83330 
Fax: (208) 934-4494 
[ ] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand-Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ x ] Facsimile 
-----------------------··--·····----
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STATE OF IDAHO ) 
:ss 
County of Ada ) 
COMES NOW Erik R. Lehtinen, and swears and affirms under oath and upon his 
personal knowledge the following: 
1. I am currently employed by the Idaho state Appellate Public Defender ("SAPD") 
as the Chief of the Appellate Unit. I have served in this capacity for over a year. 
Prior to that, I served as a Deputy State Appellate Public Defender for 
approximately eight years. 
2. On or about February 3, 2010, the SAPD was appointed to represent Robert 
Terry Johnson in his appeal from the district court's summary dismissal of his 
petition for post-conviction relief in Gooding County Case No. CV 2009-399 
(originally designated Supreme Court No. 37378; later re-designated Supreme 
Court No. 39433). 
3. Originally, Mr. Johnson's appeal was assigned to another attorney at the SAPD 
(Sarah Tompkins); however, well before the Appellant's Brief was flied, the case 
was re-assigned to me. From that point forward, I had exclusive responsibility for 
Mr. Johnson1s appeal. 
4. Based on my work as Mr. Johnson's appellate counsel, I have personal 
knowledge of all matters set forth herein. 
___ __,5=-·---=UP-on reviewing the Clerk's Record and Reporter's Transcript, I came to the belief 
that the district court ·erred in summarily dismissing Mr. Johnson's Brady claim. 
Thus, the claim presented on appeal was stated as follows: "Did the district court 
AFFIDAVIT OF ERIK R. LEHTINEN - Page 1 
58 
07-03-'13 14:57 FROM-Hepworth & Assoc. 208-736-0041 T-352 P0003/0013 F-
err in summarily dismissing the Brady claim presented in Mr. Johnson's 
successive petition for post-conviction relief?" 
6. In arguing this claim in the Appellant's Brief, there were three arguments that I 
felt needed to be made: first, it had to be made clear that Mr. Johnson's petition 
(and the supporting materials} raised a genuine issue of material fact which, if 
resolved in his favor, would have established a Brady violation which would have 
entitled him to post-conviction relief; second, there was need to e:xplain why 
Mr. Johnson's Brady claim was properly presented in a successive petition for 
post-conviction relief; and third, because the district court seemed to have 
dismissed Mr. Johnson's Brady claim, in part, on timeliness grounds, a brief 
explanation of why that claim was, in fact, timely, was warranted. 
7. At the time, I did not view the timeliness issue as a serious impediment to 
Mr. Johnson obtaining relief. This was so for two reasons: 
a. First, below, the state had not made a credible or compelling argument 
contes1ing the timeliness of the Brady claim (see Brief in Support of 
Motion for Summary Disposition - Dismissal, pp.14-15 (Oct. 13, 2009) 
(citing one Idaho case holding that a successive petition filed within 42 
days of learning of the facts underlying the claim was filed within a 
"reasonable time," and citing another case holding that a successive 
petition filed four years after learning of the relevant facte was not filed 
within a ''reasonable time"); Subsequent Brief in Support of Motion for 
Summary Disposition - Dismissal, pp.12-13 (Dec. 24, 2009) (arguing that 
the Brady material at issue was known to Mr. Johnson as of the date of his 
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preliminary hearing back in 1993)); Mr. Johnson's successive post-
conviction counsel (David Heida and Isaac Keppler) never made a record 
of why ft took Mr. Johnson approximately four months to file his 
successive petition after receiving evidence of the Brady violation; and the 
district court appeared not to have been totally convinced that the Brady 
claim was untimely (see Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Motion for 
Summary Dismissal, pp.29-30 (discussing the fact that Mr. Johnson's 
successive petition was filed approximately four months after receiving 
evidence of the Brady violation; noting that the relevant legal question was 
whether the petition was filed within a "reasonable timen of learning of the 
Brady violation; acknowledging that, "[a)s to the Brady violation, it is less 
clear whether it is untimely"; and never explicitly ruling that the Brady 
claim was. in fact, untimely)). 
b. Second, and much more importantly, I did not perceive there to be a 
remotely credible argument that Mr. Johnson's successive petition was not 
filed within a "reasonable time." I firmly believed that the filing of a 
successive post-conviction petition by an Indigent, incarcerated, pro se 
petitioner within approximately four months of receiving evidence of a 
Brady violation in his criminal case was infinitely reasonable under any 
colorable standard for defining a •'reasonable time." In part. this was 
because I was aware of no Idaho appellate decision which had ever held 
that post-conviction petition in a non-capital case, filed after a delay 
significantly less than a year, was filed outside Of a "reasonable time.'' 
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Specifically, the shortest time period I was aware of, in which it had been 
said in a non-capital case that a time period less than a year was not a 
"reasonable time," was the 51 weeks considered to be unreasonable in 
Schwartz v. State, 145 Idaho 186, 191-92 (Ct. App. 2008}. 
8. Because I did not perceive there to be a credible argument that Mr. Johnson's 
successive petition was time-barred as not having been filed within a "reasonable 
time/I in the Appellanfs Brief, I addressed the timeliness issue somewhat 
cursorily, simply identifying the applicable "reasonable time" standard, and 
pointing out that under the basic facts of Mr. Johnson's case a successive 
petition filed within approximately four months was clearly filed within a 
"reasonable time." {See Appellant's Brief, pp.33-34.) At the time, I was aware 
that the "reasonable timen standard was problematic because it was poorly 
defined under Idaho law; however, I saw no need to open "Pandora's Box" by 
trying to define the ••reasonable timen standard because, as noted, I believed it 
beyond cavil that Mr. Johnson's successive petition was flied within a 
"reasonable time" under any colorable interpretation of that standard, 
9. I was quite surprised when I received the State's Respondent's Brief in 
Mr. Johnson's appeal, and discovered that the State's primary argument: on 
appeal was that Mr. Johnson's successive petition had been properly dismissed 
because Mr. Johnson failed to establish that he filed his petition within a 
"reasonable time." (See Respondenfs Brief, pp.8-10.) In making this argument, 
the State contended that what is a "reasonable time" is evaluated on a case-by• 
case basis and that, in the absence of some affirmative explanation on the record 
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of why it took him four months to file his successive petition, Mr. Johnson failed 
to show, under the facts of his case, that his petition was flied within a 
reasonable time. (See Respondent's Brief, pp.8-10.) 
10. The State's focus on the timeliness of Mr. Johnson's petition and1 in particular, 
ifs claim that under the unique facts of circumstances of his case he had failed to 
show that his petition was filed within a "reasonable time," necessitated a 
discussion of just what the "reasonable time" standard means, and how it ought 
to apply to Mr. Johnson's case. Thus, in preparing Mr. Johnson's Reply Brief, I 
had to delve into "Pandora's Box. n 
11. In the Reply Brief, I argued that a "reasonable time" should no longer be judged 
on a case-by-case basis because, although Charboneau v. State, 144 Idaho 900 
(2007), had required as much in non-capital cases, a year later, in Pizzuto v. 
State, 146 Idaho 720 (2008), a capital case, the Idaho Supreme Court had 
recognized that a case-by-case approach to determining whether a post• 
conviction petition was flied within a "reasonable time" is problematic, and it 
abandoned that approach (at least in capital cases) and applied the statutory 
time limit for bringing post-conviction claims generaUy-in that case, 42 days, as 
set forth under I.C. § 19-2719, the capital post-conviction statute. Accordingly, I 
argued that a "reasonable time" for Mr. Johnson to have filed his successive 
petition should be measured by the statutory time limit for bringing post-
conviction claims generally as well-one year, as set forth under I.C. § 19-4902, 
the non-capital post-conviction statute. Alternatively, I argued that even if the 
Pizzuto reasoning did not apply to non-capital oases, such that the question of 
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whether Mr. Johnson's petition was filed within a 11reasonable time11 had to be 
judged on the unique facts and circumstances of his case, the reality is that 
Mr. Johnson's filing of a successive petition in only about four months was 
reasonable. 
12. With regard to the latter (alternative) argument, although I believed it 
unquestionable that the approximately four months at issue in this case was weU 
within a "reasonable time" for an indigent incarcerated pro se petitioner to file a 
successive petition (see 1} 7(b), supra), the fact is that when I realized the State 
was actually going to pursue the "timeliness" issue, I regretted that I did not have 
a record of the specific reasons why it took Mr. Johnson approximately four 
months to file his successive petition. I knew (because, throughout the pendency 
of the appeal, Mr. Johnson repeatedly explained it to me) exactly why it took 
Mr. Johnson a number of months to file his successive petition; however, 
because those reasons were never placed into the record by Mr. Johnson's 
successive post-conviction counsel, I was forbidden from discussing them on 
appeal. See, e.g., Nelson v. Nelson, 144 Idaho 710, 714 {2007). 
13. In particular, Mr. Johnson told me that when he first learned of the Brady 
evidence/violation, he had no idea what to do with it. He told me he did not know 
what to file {/.a., a motion in his criminal case, a motion in his first post-conviction 
______ c.,..a....,s..,..e, a new ~tition for P-Ost-conviction relief, a P-etition for a writ of habeas 
corpus, or some other document), or where to file it (i.e., in state court or in 
federal court). If I recall correctly, he said he wasted a significant amount of time 
trying to hire an attorney himself; then, when that failed, ha tried to get advice 
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from his family; and, finally, he relied on his family to try to hire an attorney, which 
also failed. All of this would have been time-consuming under the best of 
circumstances, but" for reasons which should be obvious, Mr. Johnson indicated it 
was an extraordinarily difficult and slow process for him while he was 
incarcerated and without funds. Ultimately, Mr. Johnson said, these efforts were 
all unsuccessful. He then attempted to seek assistance from the prison 
paralegal, he said. ff I recall correctly, Mr. Johnson indicated that he had to wait 
weeks for his appointments with the paralegal and, making matters worse, I 
believe he told me that he needed multiple appointments with the paralegal 
before he was in a position to start putting the &uccessive petition together. Had 
this information been made part of the record below, such that it would have 
been proper for me to present it on appeal, I certainly would have presented this 
Information in response to the State's "timeliness" argument. Nevertheless, I still 
firmly believed that our briefing demonstrated that Mr. Johnson's successive 
petition was timely filed regardless of which standard might apply. 
14. Mr. Johnson's case was originally assigned to the Court of Appeals, which 
declined the State's request for oral argument 
15. In an unpublished opinion, the Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's 
summary dismissal of Mr. Johnson's successive petition, It reasoned that 
Mr. Johnson's successive P-etitlon was untimely. \JY'lth regard to the question of 
how to define a "reasonable time," the Court of Appeals declined to extend the 
reasoning of Pizzuto to non-capital cases, holding as follows: 'While Charboneau 
was decided one year prior to Pizzuto, the Court's decision in Pizzuto was limited 
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to capital cases and did not expressly overrule Charboneau1s reasonable time 
standard for successive applications filed in noncapital cases. Thus, we decline 
to extend the rationale of Pizzuto to conclude that a reasonable time for filing a 
successive application in a noncapital case is one year. 11 Applying a case-by-
case approach, the Court of Appeals concluded, without any analysis 
whatsoever, that "Johnson has failed to establish that he filed his successive 
application wHhin a reasonable time." 
16. To this day, I respectfully disagree with the Court of Appeals' conclusions-both 
its continued adherence to Charboneau, even after Pizzuto, and its conclusory 
holding that approximately four months was not a "reasonable time" for 
Mr. Johnson to have filed his successive petition. With regard to the latter 
holding, although I believe the Court of Appeals was incorrect to have held that 
the approximately four months at issue was not a "reasonable time" based on the 
record before the it, t believe that the Court of Appeals may have reached a 
different conclusion had I had a better record detailing the specific reasons why 
Mr. Johnson's successive petition was not filed until approximately four months 
after his discovery of the Brady evidenceMolation. 
17. Following issuance of the Court of Appeals' opinion, I filed a timely petition for 
review with the Idaho Supreme Court. In the brief supporting that motion, I 
______ -argued that review should be granted in order for tile Supreme Court to resolve 
the question left unanswered in Pizzuto-whether the "reasonable time" standard 
in non-capital cases should be defined in terms of usual statute of limitations in 
non-capital post-conviotion cases, i.e., one year. 
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18. The Supreme Court granted review. 
19. In its Respondent's Brief on Review, the State argued, inter alia, that the Court's 
grant of review should be withdrawn as improvidently granted because 
Mr. Johnson had, in the original Appellant's Brief, "advocated for application of 
the case-by-case analysis of what constitutes a reasonable delay in asserting a 
newly discovered claim/ and then changed his approach in his Reply Brief, 
"arguing for the first time that any delay less than one year was automatically 
reasonable." Therefore, the State reasoned, "the Idaho Court of Appeals 
ultimately applied the legal standard advocated by Johnson on appeal." On the 
"timelness" issue, the State also argued that, contrary to what had been argued 
in the Appellant's Brief in Support of Petition for Review, this area of the law is 
11settled" and the reasoning of Pizzuto does not apply to non-capital cases, and 
that, under the facts and circumstances of his case, Mr. Johnson failed to show 
that his petition was flied within a "reasonable time." 
20. The State's Respondent's Brief on Review warranted a response. Thus, I filed 
an Appellant's Reply Brief on Review. In that brief, r argued that review had not 
been improvidently granted. I pointed out that the State was incorrect Insofar as 
it claimed that a case-by-case approach to determining whether a succes~ive 
petition was filed within a "reasonable time" had been "advocated" in the original 
-------L-!AP-P-ellant's Brief, and I argued why the State's 11invited error" and 
waiver/forfeiture theories were without legal merit. i also explained why the 
State's argument that the law in this area is "settledn was without merit. Finally, 
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turning to the question of whether Mr. Johnson's petition was, in fact, filed within 
a "reasonable time," I refuted the State's arguments on this point. 
21. The Supreme Court heard an oral argument in Mr. Johnson's case. At that 
argument, Justice Eismann questioned me at some length concerning the 
question of whether my Pizzuto-related argument was adequately raised in the 
original Appellant's Brief and, thus, properly before the Court. I conceded (as I 
had in the briefing) that the Pizzuto case had not been cited in the opening brief, 
but attempted to argue that the Pizzuto-related argument was nevertheless 
properly considered because it was nothing more than an attempt to define the 
"reasonable time" standard, which undoubtedly had been argued In the original 
Appellant's Brief. Justice Eismann, however, had no patience for my argument in 
this regard, as he repeatedly cut off my attempted explanation, and at least once 
accused me of "lying" to the Court. After the argument, Justice Eismann refused 
to shake my hand, as is customary for the Court and, instead, again accused me 
of having lied to the Court. 
22. Ultimately, the Supreme Court entered an Order Dismissing Appellant's Petition 
for Review. The Court ruled that review had been improvidently granted because 
"the issue this Court initially wanted to address on review was not raised in 
Appellant's opening brief on review [sic] •.• ." (emphasis in original). The only 
logic~I inference is that the Court was referring to the question of whether the 
rationale of Pizzuto should be applied non-capital cases, such that a "reasonable 
time" for filing a successive post-conviction petition in a non-capital case should 
be deemed to be one year from discovery of the facts underlying the claim(s) 
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presented therein, and it meant to say that the issue was not properly before the 
Court because it was not raised in Mr. Johnson's original Appellant's Brief. 
23. Looking back at Mr. Johnson's appeal now, I disagree with the Supreme Court's 
conclusion that the argument presented to the Supreme Court was not properly 
raised before the Court of Appeals. I believe that the argument concerning 
Pizzuto. because it was an attempt to define the 11reasonable time" standard, was 
fairly encompassed within the argument made in Mr. Johnson's very first brief-
that his successive petition was flied within a "reasonable time." Nevertheless, 
the Supreme Court has spoken on this issue, and it has concluded that the 
potentially meritorious argument concerning Pizzuto was not raised in the 
opening brief, as it should have been. 
24. Had I presented the Piztuto argument in Mr. Johnson's opening brief on appeal, 
presumably the Supreme Court would not have dismissed the petition for review 
and, instead, would have reached the merits of the Pizzuto argument. 
25. As the Pizzuto argument was a meritorious one, which may have ultimately been 
adopted, and as the petition and it supporting materials raised a genuine issue of 
material fact as to whether the State wrongfully withheld exculpatory evidence, 
there is a reasonable probability that the appeal would have tumed out differently 
had I explicitly raised the Pizzuto argument in the opening brief on appeal. 
Dated this 1•t day of July, 2013. 
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STATE OF IDAHO ) 
:ss 
County of Ada ) 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me on this 1st day of July, 2013. 
c=·-=- --~ 
NOTARY PUBLIC FOR ID 
Residing in Boise, Idaho 
Commission Expires 2112/2016 
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Steven R. McRae [ISB No. 7984] 
McRAE LAW OFFICE, PLLC 
P.O. Box 1233 
Twin Fall~, ID 83303-1233 
Telephone No. (208) 944-0755 
Facsimile No. (208) 736-0041 
e-mail: SMcRae@Magic Valley Legal.com 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
208-736-0041 
- fJISTRtCT COURT 
tic»~DING CO. IIAHO 
FILED 
2Ul3 JUL -3 PM 2: 50 
CiJU/H f CLERK 
IY:OttL. 
iEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF 
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF GOODING 
ROBERT JOHNSON, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
)ss. 
County of Ada ) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Case No. CV-2013-0000084 
AFFIDAVIT OF ROBERT 
RICHARD JONES 
ROBERT RICHARD JONES. being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and states: 
1. I am over the age of eighteen (18) and am of sound mind to make this affidavit. 
2. I am presently an inmate in the Idaho Correctional Center, and I have been an 
inmate under the supervision Idaho Department of Corrections since my sentencing in Canyon 
County Case No. CR-1989-13922-C on June 24, 1991. 
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3. While in the prison system, I have been employed in different positions. 
4. From about or around 1991 through 1998, I was employed as an "Inmate Law 
Clerk" ("ILC") in the prison system at both the Idaho Maximum Security Institution ("IMSI'') 
(from about or around 1991 through 1995) and the Idaho State Correctional Institute ("ISCI") 
(from about or around 1995 through 1998). 
5. For example, attached hereto as Exhibit A is a true and correct copy of my case 
load sheet in 1995 to 1996 as I worked as an ILC at that time. 
6. I am well aware of the practices and procedures of the ILCs in IMSI and !SCI 
during the periods in which I served as an ILC. 
7. While employed as an ILC. I, as well as other ILCs, would meet with inmates that 
· had legal inquiries. including but not limited to post-conviction inquiries. 
8. When I or another ILC met with an inmate, we would determine whether or not 
we could assist the inmate. 
9. If I or another ILC determined that we could assist the inmate, we would either 
provide advice to the inmate, or we would draft the required legal documents for the inmate. 
10. If I or another ILC determined that we would draft the required legal documents 
for an inmate, it was often the normal practice that the irunate had very little involvement in the 
process and relied on our knowledge as ILCs to prepare the legal documents. 
11. I am aware now that sometime in the late 1990's, the Idaho Department of 
Corrections quit employing inmates as lCCs. 
12. To my knowledge, in 2009, the Idaho Correctional Center no longer employed 
inmates as ILCs. 
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DATED this Zltt<of June, 2013. 
Q..Qu~ 
Robert Richard Jones 
.+-~ 
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me this '2,1 day of June, 2013. 
JAMI!$ G. QUmM 
h NOTARY PUBl.f¢ i ~"""'STA.,;.Tl:..;;·OF.,..l,._D ~ ......... 
~l&~ 
N0TA.RYPUBLiy/0R IDAHO 
Residing at: IV/ P-- / , I. 
Commission Expires: '1 J 0(2-& -( '3 
---------------------········---··-·-····-·-------------------
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COUNTY CLERK 
.~ IDUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STA TE OF 
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF GOODING 
ROBERT JOHNSON, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
)ss. 
County of Ada ) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Case No. CV-2013-0000084 
PARTIAL SUPPLEMENTAL 
AFFIDAVIT OF ROBERT JOHNSON 
ROBERT JOHNSON, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and states: 
l. I am over the age of eighteen ( 18) and am of sound mind to make this affidavit. 
--------2-;---J-am-the-Petitioner-in-the-above-entitled-document:--I-make-this-affidavit-to-further---
explain the process that I went through in filing my two prior post-conviction cases. 
3. I filed my first post-conviction case on November 30, 1995 (the "First Post-
Conviction Case".) 
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4. When l filed the .F'ust Poot-Con.victi011 Case,. 1 did oot individually prepere tbe 
docutneo1s for ibe t.BSe. In ~ I bad used the services of a11 ltmlllte Law Clerk that was 
JllOvided to _, at the 1dl1ho Maximum Sec111lty Jnsti1U1ion ("IMSl"), whet-e 1 Wll& housed at the 
lime, and the Cnn:ulle Law Clcflt :prq,ated all of 1hc doCUIDCll!S that C filed oo initia!c the Fint 
Post-Conviction Case. 
5. r met wi1h an Inmll!e Law Clerk fflld explained my untlerlyil18 crimimtl case.. At 
1bat fun~ the fnmate Law Clerk explained 10 me 1hd be could help me and look ftom me the 
documelltll 1hllt I bad ill Ngards ro my undedying criminal case. 
6. The Jnma.te lAw Clerk prepared aJI or the documelllS fur my First Post-Convicli.<Jn. 
Cll!le. I did not prepare the documents whatsoever aoo relied on the u:pertise of the Inmate Law 
Clerlc, who also assisted me in filing the docWllell19 ill Gooding County. 
7. My Fir.!I Post-Conviction Case was srunmarily dismissed 011 Jlllle l 1. 1996, -which 
dis.missal was affumed by the ldabo CowtofAppeals in July of 1997. 
8. &lmetirne in 2009, Thomas Peterson. the alleged co-defendant in my underlying 
etilDioal =e. handed me a notarized confe1Simt, a txue aod com,ct copy is aaached 1:teJeto as 
Exhibit A. 
9. Al file time that Mr. Petermll gave me the notarized confession, he i..Cormed. me 
that he bad confessed to 1be ea:irnes that l was oharged with and oonressed tha1 ( was a victim oo 
1he night itt qoostion- which contession Wllll on an tmdio tape- before we were clia£g_ed with the 
crime-of trmrd« os c1>-defendanll!, and diet he had oollfesaed to his~ incruding Severt 
SwctlllOII. 
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10. Mr. Pereison also told me tllllt Me. Phillip Brown, !he Gooding County Proseeutoc 
at 1he time of my Ulldcrtyillg criminal case, knew 11:mt I wm a victim the night that Mr. Peterson 
rommitted the murders. 
11. Mr. l'l::tftWfl told me that he bad 1111 llflreeotent witlt Mr. Swenson and Mr. Brown 
to point tile fioger al me to save himself from ttw death peolllty m Mr. Perersoo:s case. 
12. I wa.s 11nawai:e of any t>f die furegoi.ng infoamatioo, itlcludiog the ex:islence of a 
CQllle$sion Oil illl!dio Cape, lllltil Ml'.. ~rson gave me the oollllitt:d oonfession and provided me 
wilh the iofommlion. 
13. I did not blow wllld 10 do wit!, this ttew iofo!Tllation fi:om Mr. Pelcrron or 1he 
proper legal procedure to use the new mrotltlation. 
14. tu soon as r could,. I contacted the paralegal a1 the Idaho Correcti.otW Center 
l'[CC") and iu,quin:d how In proceed with & :new infotma1ion,. as I knew a that time lbaf [0:: 
oo longer employed rrunare Lllw Cled<s. 
15. The paralegal at ICC lnfunned me that he was not m attomey aod co\lld not gi:lle 
me advice Oil wltat 1o oo. 
l6. As l was waitin_g 10 speal: with. 1he paralegal at ICC, I C()tltaered my aunt, Karen 
Devine, as s0011 as I could. I aslce!l her to help me fincl an atromey that could help me tletermiru, 
bowu, proooed with thenewiinormatioo. 
17. My aunt provided me widl addresl!lls of attorneys for me to contact. AB 0000 BS I 
·-··was able. I wrote lettecs ti, all-of the attomey, whooe addre!191ls my llll!lt provided. 
IS. Only ooe attorney replied to me, Demus Benjamin. I spt>lce with Mr. Benjamin 
on the telephone as 00011 as I was ab]e, t111d be told me th.at the proper way ID use the new 
information was to file anodler post-conviction peti1iOJL 
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19. Until my cooveraation with Mr. Bettjarnin, which was in May of 2009, 1 was 
uoaware that the proper procedure to 11se lbc mfurmalion WllS to file another post..:oo.viction 
pdition, and J WllS also unaware that I was legally able file a. second pl)!St-0011vi&1ion petition 
~ after filing tlie First Post-C-OnvtctionPetitfon. 
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2()_ At my next aYailable 1imr.,, I again visited Ure paralegal or ICC aod reque31l:d a 
)llld!:et of documet>ls fur post-<:0mriclion petitions . 
21. It took s.ome time fur me to 1equelill fbc pacl:el,. receive the packet, fill ont the 
lnfonnll1ion needed in the pooloot, ffiJ'JC'.'lt an awolntment 1D male copies of1he paekd, reqw,st 
llllapfKJiotment in ICC for ll01ary services, nod to mail out tlte eomplcted paclccl 
22. l look all of the actiOIIS described herein 1111 soon as l wu able; however, the 
JllOce:IS still took weeks to 1.>ompkre given lbat l no longer had an lnmare Law Cleil: to assist me 
with m;y lcga1 document, my Jack ofresO'llICeS, IIOd tlie ooostraints of my 11.Ctiooa in (CC. 
21. I infmmed my attorney, David Heida, Ylf:!1> teprcsented 1uc in my subsequent post-
g convietioo petition, all of the infommtiott as cootained herein. 
(/J 
(/J 
,«c 24. Mt. Heida did oot use tlie informalion m OOIJ!ained lJerein in represecling me iD 
¢0 
..c:: IJlY suhsequett1 poot-ciomrictiOE pctilion. awl specifically in arguing that 1 filed my post-
t'. ~ oonvictioo petition in a timely trn1nner. 
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'A 
DATED this h of June, 2013. 
.f Ii 
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me this '2-. ]day of June, 2013. 
~}/&_~ 
JA ES'G. QUINN 
NOTARY PUI\LIC 
~ L,~Sf/\~li~O~FIO;.::AHO..--
OTARYPUBLI<; ~OR IDAHO 
Residing at: N / ft / f. 
Commission Expires: °l, ,r o I '2- fJ t 3 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISmctunw ~, K 
IY: STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF GO-:r;:O"n:D~I ~""'-::--,!:--
ROBERT JOHNSON, ) 
) 
) 
) 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
) Case No. CV-2013-84 
) 
) 
) 
) 
______________ ) 
MEMORANDUM DECISION RE: NOTICE OF INTENT TO DISMISS 
On February 14, 2013, the Petitioner, Robert Johnson, filed his Second Successive 
Petition for Post-Conviction Relief. The Court issued its Notice of Intent to Dismiss on March 
12, 2013. On March 26, 2013 the Court granted to the Petitioner an additional 30 days within 
which to respond to the Court's Notice of Intent to Dismiss. On March 29, 2013 the.petitioner 
filed his Response to Notice of Intent to Dismiss. The Petitioner after March 29, 2013 had not 
filed any additional briefs or affidavits for the courts consideration within the extension of time 
granted previously by the court. 
After considering the Response filed by the Petitioner, the court on April 22, 2013 then 
appointed counsel for the petitioner for the limited purpose of filing a "further or additional 
response, supported by admissible evidence on the issue of timeliness and legal argument as to 
l - MEMORANDUM DECISION RE: NOTICE OF INTENT TO DISMISS 283 
why [the] Second Successive Petition for Post-Conviction Relief should not be dismissed based 
on the doctrine ofres judicata or the doctrine of 'law of the case'." 
On July 3, 2013 the Petitioner's appointed counsel filed his Reply to Notice of Intent to 
Dismiss, together with the Affidavits of Robert Johnson; Robert Richard Jones; and Erik R. 
Lehtinen. 
I. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
The court hereby incorporates the procedural and factual background as set forth in the 
Court's Notice oflntent to Dismiss. To summarize the history of this case, the petitioner on June 
24, 1994 pied guilty to two counts of felony murder and was sentenced to fixed life on 
September 21, 1994. 
On November 30, 1995 the petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief which was 
summarily dismissed on June 13, 1996. The summary dismissal was affirmed on July 10, 1997. 
Robert Terry Johnson v. State of Idaho, 1997 Unpublished Opinion No. 617. 
On July 29, 2009 the petitioner filed a Successive Petition for Post-Conviction Relief 
based on an alleged Brad/ violation. On January 15, 2010 the court dismissed the successive 
petition on its merits and on the basis that the successive petition was untimely filed. The 
petitioner appealed the dismissal of his successive petition. The Court of Appeals affirmed the 
dismissal on the basis that the petition was not timely filed. The Court of Appeals did not address 
the merits of the successive petition based on the Brady violation. Robert Terry Johnson v. State 
of Idaho, 2011 Unpublished Opinion No. 574 (August 8, 2011). 
1 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194 (1963) 
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After issuance of the opinion of the Court of Appeals, the petitioner sought and was 
granted review by the Idaho Supreme Court, however, the court dismissed the petition for review 
on January 16, 2013 and the Remittitur was issued on January 16, 2013. 
On February 14, 2013 the petitioner filed a second Successive Petition for Post-
Conviction Relief. This successive petition again raises the same Brady violation that was 
asserted in his 2009 successive petition for post-conviction relief. In addition the petitioner 
asserts that his 2009 post-conviction counsel was ineffective in failing to conduct or properly 
perform discovery and in failing to properly argue and present evidence, including obtaining 
affidavits as to the issue of timeliness of his petition. He also asserts that the court should have 
conducted hearings on motions that he had filed in his 2009 action and that the State Appellate 
Public Defender failed to properly present on appeal his issue of timeliness of his 2009 
successive petition for post-conviction relief. 
II. 
JUDICIAL NOTICE 
The Court in its Notice oflntent to Dismiss pursuant to I.R.E. 201 tookjudicial notice of 
the following: 
1. Unpublished Opinion No. 617, Robert Terry Johnson v. State of Idaho, dated July 
10, 1997; 
2. Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Motion for Summary Dismissal, entered 
January 15, 2010, Robert Terry Johnson v. State of Idaho, Gooding County Case No. 
CV-2009-399; 
3. Unpublished Opinion No. 574, Robert Terry Johnson v. State of Idaho (Docket 
No. 37378), dated August 8, 2011; 
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4. Remittitur, (Docket No. 37378), issued January 16, 2013; 
5. Registrar of Actions (ROA) in CV-2009-399. 
In addition to the above, for purposes of this decision, the court hereby takes judicial notice of 
the practices, policies and procedures of the Idaho Department of Corrections as concerns and 
inmates "access to courts" as set forth in: 
a. Board of Correction IDAPA Rule Number 405, Policy Control No. 405.02.01.001, 
adopted 8-15-1995, attached hereto as Appendix "F". 
III. 
SUCCESSIVE POST-CONVICTION STANDARD 
A petition for post-conviction relief is a civil proceeding, entirely distinct from the 
underlying criminal action. Ferrier v. State, 135 Idaho 797, 25 P.3d 110 (2001). If the petition fails 
to present or be accompanied by admissible evidence supporting its allegations, and making a prima 
facie case, i.e. establishing each essential element of the claim, then summary dismissal is 
appropriate. Hernandez v. State, 133 Idaho 794, 992 P.2d 789 (1999); Martinez v. State, 126 Idaho 
813, 816, 892 P.2d 488, 491 (Ct. App. 1995). While the Court is required to accept petitioner's 
unrebutted allegations, it need not accept petitioner's bare or conclusory allegations. Berg v. State, 
131 Idaho 517,960 P.2d 738 (l998);Kingv. State, 114 Idaho 442, 757P.2d 705 (Ct. App.' 1988). 
When presenting a successive petition for post-conviction relief, it is the burden of the 
petitioner to establish sufficient reason as to why the ground for relief was not asserted in her 
original petition; or was inadequately asserted in her original petition or that any waiver of an 
asserted claim was not knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently waived. LC. § 19-4908. Therefore 
the court should not consider the grounds set forth in a successive petition until the petitioner has 
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established a "sufficient reason" as to why it was not raised or was inadequately raised in the 
original petition. 
The Idaho Court of Appeals in Baker v. State, 142 Idaho 411,420 128 P.3d 948,957 (Ct. 
App. 2005) summarized the standard relative to a successive petition for post-conviction relief as 
follows: 
The Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act (UPCPA) is designed 
to deal with collateral attacks upon allegedly improper convictions 
and sentences, not collateral attacks upon other post-conviction 
proceedings. Wolfe v. State, 113 Idaho 337,339, 743 P.2d 990, 992 
(Ct.App.1987). Ineffective assistance of counsel in post-
conviction proceedings is not among the permissible grounds for 
filing another post-conviction relief application. Id. All grounds 
for relief available to an applicant under the UPCP A must be 
raised in an applicant's original, supplemental, or amended 
application. LC. § 19-4908. The language of Section 19-4908 
prohibits successive applications in those cases where the applicant 
"knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently" waived the grounds for 
relief sought in the successive application or offers no "sufficient 
reason" for omitting those grounds in the original application. See 
Palmer v. Dermitt, 102 Idaho 591, 593, 635 P.2d 955, 957 (1981). 
However, Section 19-4908 allows an applicant to raise a ground 
for relief, which was addressed in a former application, if he or she 
can demonstrate sufficient reason why that ground was 
inadequately raised or presented in the initial post-conviction 
action. See Hernandez v. State, 133 Idaho 794, 798, 992 P.2d 789, 
793 (Ct.App.1999). An allegation that a claim was not adequately 
presented in the first post-conviction action due to the ineffective 
assistance of prior post-conviction counsel, if true, provides 
sufficient reason for permitting issues that were inadequately 
presented to be presented in a subsequent application for post-
conviction relief. Hernandez, 133 Idaho at 798, 992 P.2d at 793. 
Therefore it is the burden of the petitioner on a successive petition for post-conviction 
relief to show that one of two things: (1) that her appointed counsel waived claims for relief 
sought which were asserted in the original petition and the waiver was not a "knowing, voluntary 
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and intelligent" waiver by the petitioner; or (2) the applicant must offer a "sufficient reason" for 
not having asserted or for having omitted grounds for relief in her original petition. 
"The statutory scheme of the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act is designed to deal 
with challenges to allegedly improper convictions and sentences, not collateral attacks upon 
other post-conviction proceedings." Nguyen v. State, 126 Idaho 494, 498, 887 P.2d 39, 43 (Ct. 
App. 1994). 
IV. 
ISSUE FOR THE COURT'S DETERMINATION 
As set forth above the issue for determination is whether the unpublished opinion of the 
court of appeals affirming the dismissal of the 2009 successive post-conviction petition on the 
basis of timeliness is a bar to this second successive petition for post-conviction relief on the 
basis of res judicata or the doctrine of law of the case. 
V. 
ANALYSIS 
The petitioner in 2009 filed a successive petition for post-conviction relief on the basis 
that he had new evidence of a Brady violation based on an affidavit of his co-defendant Thomas 
Peterson. This court dismissed the successive petition based on its merits as well as ori the basis 
of timeliness. This court determined that the successive petition filed in 2009 was not filed 
within a reasonable time. Charboneau v. State, 144 Idaho 900, 174 P.3d 870 (2007). The 
determination of this court as to the issue of timeliness was affirmed on appeal. (Robert Terry 
Johnson v. State, Unpublished Opinion No. 574, Robert Terry Johnson v. State of Idaho, dated 
August 8, 2011). 
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The petitioner has filed a Second Successive Petition, which seeks post-conviction relief 
on the same claim of a Brady violation as alleged in his 2009 Petition. As noted above, section 
19-4908 "allows an applicant to raise a ground for relief, which was addressed in a former 
application, if he or she can demonstrate sufficient reason why that ground was inadequately 
raised or presented in the initial post-conviction action." Baker v. State, supra. It would appear 
that the petitioner claims that his 2009 post-conviction relief counsel failed to adequately present 
facts as to the issue of timeliness of his 2009 Petition, and that if such facts had been presented 
his 2009 Petition would not have been dismissed as untimely. This court has not found nor has 
counsel for the petitioner identified any case in this State that has addressed the issue of 
counsel's failure to adequately argue or support a claim that petition for post-conviction was 
filed timely as a basis for a successive petition for post- conviction relief. Clearly if the 
petitioner's prior post-conviction failed to provide facts or other admissible evidence disclosed 
by the petitioner to such counsel relevant to the issue of timeliness, and if such "facts" would 
have established that petitioner filed his petition within a reasonable time, then the failure to 
provide such evidence or facts may constitute a "sufficient reason" for this second successive 
petition for post-conviction relief. On the other hand if the petitioner fails to establish such facts 
in this second successive petition as to the issue of timeliness, then this successive petition would 
be barred by either res judicata or the law of the case. 
This court in its Notice of Intent to Dismiss has already addressed the facts presented in 
support of this second successive petition and why he has failed to establish a "sufficient reason" 
for this successive petition for post-conviction relief. The petitioner does not allege or claim a 
sufficient reason based on prior counsel's failure to argue an extension of Pizzuto v. State, 146 
Idaho 720, 202 P.3d 642 (2008) to a non-capital case. The petitioner claims that there were facts 
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he disclosed to prior counsel that were not provided to the court. Those facts are alleged to be 
contained in the Supplemental Affidavit of Robert Johnson and the Affidavit of Robert Richard 
Jones, filed with this court on July 3, 2013. These affidavits can be summarized in relevant part 
as follows: 
(1) According to Robert Richard Jones he has been an Idaho Department of Corrections 
(IDOC) inmate since June 24, 1991. That between 1991 to 1998 he served as an 
Inmate Law Clerk (ILC) at the Idaho Maximum Security Institution and /or Idaho 
State Correctional Institute. That as an ICL he would meet with an inmate on matters 
including post-conviction relief and would decide if they could assist an inmate and if 
he could, he would either provide advice to the inmate or he would draft the required 
legal documents for the inmate. He states that sometime in the late 1990's IDOC was 
no longer employing ILC's. 
(2) According to Robert Johnson, when he filed his 1995 petition for post-conviction 
relief he relied on an ILC to prepare and file the petition. After he received the written 
notarized confession from Thomas Peterson, he "did not know what to do with [the] 
new information" and he "knew ... that ICC no longer employed Inmate Law Clerks" 
and that "as soon as I could, I contacted the paralegal at the Idaho Correctional Center 
(ICC) and inquired how to proceed with the new information ... ". The paralegal 
informed him that he could not provide "advice on what to do." Prior to speaking to 
the paralegai2, he contacted his aunt Karen Devine, "as soon as I could", and asked 
her for help to find an attorney. His aunt provided him with the addresses' for some 
attorney and he wrote letters to the attorney's "as soon as I was able". Dennis 
Benjamin was the only attorney to reply to his letters and he spoke to Mr. Benjamin 
by telephone "as soon as I was able". Mr. Benjamin told him he needed to file another 
petition for post-conviction relief. "At my next available time, I visited the 
paralegal... and requested a packet of documents for post-conviction petitions." 
Further, "[I] took some time for me to request the packet, receive the packet, fill out 
the information needed in the packet, request an appointment to make copies of the 
2 
"As I was waiting to speak with the paralegal ... I contacted my aunt, Karen Devine, as soon as I could .... " 
(Affidavit, ~16) 
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packet, request an appointment in ICC for notary services, and to mail out the 
completed packet." Lastly the "process still took weeks to complete" because he did 
not have an ILC to assist him, a lack of resources and the "constraints of my actions 
in ICC." 
The affidavits submitted in response to the court's notice of intent to dismiss and filed in 
support of this successive petition must be considered in regards to an inmate's right of access to 
the courts. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that states are not required to provide legal 
assistants or law clerks to prisoners to ensure meaningful access to courts. See Lewis v. Casey, 
518 U.S. 343, 351, 116 S.Ct. 2174, 135 L.Ed.2d 606 (1996) (concluding that there is no 
"freestanding right to a law library or legal assistance"). Although a state must provide its 
prisoners with the necessary tools to access the courts, this access does not mean the inmate must 
be provided with legal advice, a complete law library or assistance with research and brief 
writing. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. at 354. 
The mere fact that IDOC stopped employing Inmate Law Clerks in the late 1990's is not 
relevant to the issue of timeliness. There can be not dispute that IDOC did and does provide a 
"legal resource center" and paralegals to assist an inmate to access the courts to the extent 
permitted by law.3 In fact the "petition for post-conviction relief' as filed in 1995, 2009 and 2013 
was a packet or form provided to the inmate by IDOC. Assuming that the petitioner relied on an 
ILC to prepare his petition for post-conviction relief in 1995, the fact remains that the petitioner 
. had to assist and provide the information to the ICL to be included in the 1995 petition. The 
petitioner knew from prior experience that the avenue or procedure to challenge a judgment of 
conviction was a petition for post-conviction relief, whether or not he prepared the petition in 
1995, he knew or should have known that could or might be an avenue or procedure for relief. 
3 See, Appendix "F" 
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In the late 1990' s IDOC replaced law libraries with "legal resource centers" and ILC' s 
with paralegals. The legal resource centers consist of books containing relevant statutes and rules 
of procedure, including the Idaho State Code and United States Code Annotated, in addition to a 
set of forms and self-help packets for inmates to fill out and submit to the courts, including 
Petitions for Post-Conviction Relief. Further, whether the assistance of an ILC or paralegal was 
provided by IDOC, that person was never legally authorized to provide "legal advice" and it 
would have been unlawful to provide legal advice. (Board of Correction IDAP A Rule Number 
405, Policy Control No. 405.02.01.001, adopted 8-15-1995, attached hereto as Appendix "F")4. 
An inmate is entitled to use the assistance of a paralegal and the legal resource center for post-
conviction relief claims. IDOC has "Access to Courts Request Forms" that an inmate can 
complete and submit to obtain the necessary post-conviction relief forms, copies, notarization 
and mailing. (See, Appendix "F"). A paralegal may not engage in any activity that might be 
considered as engaging in the unauthorized practice of law. 
The petitioner sometime prior to March 10, 2009, which he previously has said was 
"early 2009", received information from Mr. Peterson that petitioner was alleged to be a victim 
and not a perpetrator of the crimes he pled guilty to. The petitioner appears to have done nothing 
towards preparing a post-conviction relief petition, after receipt of information in "early 2009" 
and prior to receipt of the Peterson affidavit. 
On March 10, 2009 the petitioner received the Peterson affidavit. 5 Mr. Johnson alleges 
he " ... did not know what to do with this information or the legal procedure to use the new 
information." (Johnson Supplemental Affidavit, ,r 13.). The petitioner new or should have known 
4 The court hereby takes judicial notice of the findings of fact relative to !DOC inmate access to courts as found in 
Meza-Sayas v. Conway, 2007 WL 260 I 086 (D. Idaho), September I 0, 2007; Bleau v. Beauclair, 2007 WL 2344926 
(D. Idaho), August 14, 2007. 
5 Mr. Johnson in his most recent affidavit states "Sometime in 2009, Thomas Peterson, ... handed me a notarized 
confession ... ". Mr. Johnson is not specific as to the date he received the confession and yet this information should 
be known to him. 
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that he could use post-conviction relief as a means to challenge his conviction based on new 
evidence. The ignorance of a person of his or her right to bring an action does not excuse the 
petitioner from filing a successive petition within a reasonable period of time from discovery of 
the alleged Brady violation. Reyes v. State, 128 Idaho 413, 415, 913 P.2d 1183, 1185 (Ct. App. 
1996). However, the petitioner was not totally ignorant by his own admission as pointed out in 
this court's notice of intent to dismiss: 
The petitioner also attached an Affidavit from his aunt, Karen 
Devine. According to Ms. Devine, the petitioner wrote to her on 
March 11, 2009 asking for her help to find an attorney to assist him 
and she attached the petitioner's letter which in part states, " .. . I 
have time limits on filing so I need help quickly . ... ". Ms. 
Devine received this letter near the "end of March". Ms. Devine 
made contact with the Idaho State Bar in the middle of April, 2009 
in an attempt to contact a lawyer for the petitioner. Ms. Devine 
believes that the petitioner was in contact with an attorney Mr. 
Benjamin in May, 2009." (Notice of Intent to Dismiss, pg. 11-12, 
emphasis added). 
The petitioner states that "as soon as [he] could [he] contacted the paralegal. .. ". (Johnson 
Supplemental Affidavit, 1 14.). This statement is nothing more than a general or conclusory 
allegation. Since his contact with a paralegal requires a written request form, the date that he 
requested paralegal assistance is readily available to the petitioner. The petitioner could have 
requested a post-conviction relief packet and he apparently did not. Instead, the petitioner wrote 
a letter to his aunt on March 11, 2009 hoping to get the assistance of an attorney, yet he had to 
know that he could not pay for the advice of an attorney. The petitioner has provided no 
admissible evidence or facts as to what he did between March 11, 2009 to May, 2009 to request, 
prepare or file a petition for post-conviction relief, although, as he stated to his aunt, he knew 
there were time limits which would suggest that he had obtained some information or knowledge 
from the legal resource center or from his prior post-conviction experience. 
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The petitioner alleges that sometime in May 2009 he spoke to an attorney, Mr. Benjamin 
and was advised to file a petition for post-conviction relief. (Johnson Supplemental Affidavit, ,r 
19.). The petitioner again is not specific as to when he requested a post-conviction relief packet 
from the legal resource center, other than to state, "at my next available time" or how long it took 
him to prepare it, other than to state "it took some time". (Johnson Supplemental Affidavit, ,r 20, 
21.). Again the petitioner is not factually specific as to dates, while this information is readily 
available to the petitioner. Such statements are as before nothing more than general allegations or 
conclusions. It is apparent that the petitioner had not allegedly provided prior appointed counsel 
"specific facts or admissible evidence" as to what he did or attempted to do to file a timely 
successive petition. It would appear that he only provided "conclusory or general allegations". 
Bare or conclusory allegations, unsubstantiated by any fact, are inadequate to entitle a petitioner 
to an evidentiary hearing. Zikovic v. State, 150 Idaho 783, 786, 251 P.3d 611, 614 (Ct. App. 
2011). See also Roman v. State, 125 Idaho 644, 647, 873 P.2d 898,901 (Ct. App. 1994); Baruth 
v. Gardner, I IO Idaho 156, 159, 715 P.2d 369,372 (Ct. App. 1986). 
"To justify a post-conviction evidentiary hearing, the petitioner must make a 
factual showing based on admissible evidence." lYfcKinney v. State, I 33 Idaho 
695, 700, 992 P.2d 144, 149 (1999). The application must be supported by written 
statements from competent witnesses or other verifiable information. Paradis v. 
State, 110 Idaho 534, 536, 716 P.2d 1306. 1308 (I 986) ( citing Drapemt v. State, 
103 Idaho 612. 617, 651 P.2d 546, 551 (Ct.App.1982)). Unsubstantiated and 
conclusory allegations are insufficient to entitle a petitioner to an evidentiary 
hearing. King v. State, 114 Idaho 442. 446, 757 P.2d 705, 709 (Ct.App.1988). 
Pizzuto v. State, 145 Idaho 155,160,233 P.3d 86, 91 (2010) 
The petitioner could have obtained an affidavit from the paralegal he had spoken to, or 
the IDOC records from the legal resource center, including but not limited to copies of his access 
to courts request forms he submitted, which he has failed to do. In fact the petitioner-does not 
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ever attest to the fact that he ever submitted any "Access to Court Request Forms''. The 
petitioner has had since January 15, 2010 to obtain additional information and facts from IDOC 
to establish the timeliness of his successive petitions for post-conviction relief and yet as of this 
date and with the assistance of counsel has failed to do so. 
The petitioner has previously admitted that he knew "in early 2009" of the alleged 
exculpatory evidence concerning Peterson. (Johnson Affidavit, dated December 3, 2009, ,r 6.). 
The petitioner received the written confession from Peterson on or about March 10, 2009 and on 
March 11, 2009 he wrote a letter to his aunt to ask that she assist him in finding a lawyer. 
(Affidavit of Karen L. Devine, dated May 3, 2011 ). It is not reasonable for the petitioner to 
believe he could hire an attorney on his own and yet he knew or should have known that he 
could have requested appointment of counsel at the time of filing a post-conviction relief 
petition, from his prior experience. The petitioner had prior knowledge of post-conviction relief 
proceedings. The petitioner on or before March 11, 2009 the petitioner knew there were times 
limits for filing a petition for post-conviction relief. The petitioner prior to May, 2009 claims to 
have had contact with an IDOC paralegal, yet he never requested a post-conviction relief packet 
and forms from the "legal resource center". In May 2009 the petitioner spoke to an attorney, 
Dennis Benjamin, who told petitioner that he needed to file a petition for post-conviction relief, 
which he knew or should have known in March 2009. The petitioner has not identified the date 
or the month that he requested a post-conviction relief packet from the "legal resource center". 
The petitioner has not identified the date or month that he received the post-conviction relief 
packet or how long it took him to complete the petition for filing. The 2009 successive petition 
was mailed to the district court for filing on July 27, 2009 and was filed on July 29, 2009. 
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This court previously determined that four ( 4) months to file a successive petition for 
post-conviction relief was unreasonable under the circumstances and therefore untimely. This 
determination was affirmed on appeal. (Unpublished Opinion No. 574, Robert Terry Johnson v. 
State of Idaho, dated August 8, 2011 )6. The petitioner has failed to establish a factually 
"sufficient reason" on the part of his prior appointed post-conviction relief counsel, as to justify 
this second successive petition. Further, the conduct of appellate counsel on post-conviction 
appeals is not grounds for relief. Nguyen v. State, 126 Idaho 494, 497-498, 887 P.2d 39, 42-43 
(Ct. App. 1994). Further, even if appellate counsel had properly raised on appeal the extension of 
Pizutto7 for purposes of the petition for review, it is pure speculation that the Idaho Supreme 
Court would have extended the reasoning in Pizutto to noncapital cases. However, in Pizutto, the 
court held that in a capital case forty-two ( 42) days from the date the petitioner knew or should 
have known of the claim, is a reasonable time to file a successive petition for post-conviction 
relief and that beyond that time the petitioner would have to show "extraordinary circumstances 
that prevented [him] from filing the claim" within the forty-two day period. Also see, Dunlap v. 
State, 131 Idaho 576, 961 P.2d 1179 (1998). The decision in Pizzuto was decided a little over a 
year before the petitioner herein discovered the alleged Brady violation. If forty-two days is a 
reasonable time to file a successive petition in a capital case there is no reason to believe that 
such a time period would not be reasonable in a non-capital case. In fact, the petitioner herein 
was able to file this second successive petition within twenty-nine (29) days of the issuance of 
the Remittitur by the Supreme Court as to his 2009 successive petition. 
The petitioner's 2009 successive petition was adjudged by this court to be untimely in 
that it was not filed within a reasonable time after discovery of the confession of his co-
6 The Court of Appeals declined to extend the Pizzuto decision to noncapital cases. 
i Pizzuto v. State, 146 Idaho 720,202 P.3d 642 (2008) 
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defendant and the decision of this court was affirmed on appeal. Under the "law of the case 
doctrine" our courts will not revisit issues that have previously been decided by an appellate 
court. Stuart v. State, 136 Idaho 490,495, 36 P.3d 1278, 1283 (2001); State v. Creech, 132 Idaho 
1, 9,966 P.2d 1, 9 (1998). Further, in post-conviction proceedings, our courts have "applied the 
related principles of res judicata to bar an attempt to raise, in an application for post-conviction 
relief, the same issue previously decided in a direct appeal." Schultz v. State, 153 Idaho 791, 798, 
291 P.3d 474, 481 (Ct. App. 2012). The second successive petition for post-conviction relief is 
barred by the doctrines of res judicata and the "law of the case". The petitioner's successive 
petition for post-conviction relief based on an alleged Brady violation was untimely asserted in 
his 2009 successive petition and remains untimely to this date. 
VI. 
CONCLUSION AND ORDER 
For the reasons set forth above and as set forth in the Court's Notice of Intent to Dismiss, 
the petitioner's second successive petition for post-conviction relief is hereby dismissed with 
prejudice. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DATED this 31 day of ~ l::( 
' 
, 2013 
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GENERAL REQUIREMENTS 
1. Qualified Legal Claims 
The IDOC has identified the following legal claims and legal claim packets in which 
paralegal staff will assist offenders. 
• 
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Note: If an offender is in need of assistance other than what is identified as qualified legal 
claims as set forth in this SOP, then the request for assistance should be sent via an 
Offender Concern Form (see SOP 316.02.01 .001 , Grievance and Informal Resolution 
Procedures for Offenders) to the Division of Prison's access to courts coordinator for 
consideration. 
State Court 
The Access to Courts Manual contains the following legal claim packets that are 
appropriate for filing in state court: 
• Rule 35. (Correction or reduction of sentence) 
• UPCPA. (Uniform Post-conviction Procedure Act) 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• Probation revocatio 
• Modification of Ida order. 
• Medical malpractic 
• Tort claim . 
• Credit for time served . 
• Power of attorney . 
• Miscellaneous forms . 
Federal Court 
The Access to Courts Manual contains the following legal clai tare 
appropriate for filing in federal court: 
• Federal civil rights. 
• Federal habeas corpus. 
• 9th Circuit appeal appeals. 
• Writ of Certiorari appeals. 
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2. Process to Request Access to Courts Assistance, Services, and Resources 
Access to Courts Request Process 
Functional Roles and 
Res onsibilities .. · Ste 
Offender 1 
Paralegal Staff 
Paralegal Staff 
Paralegal Staff 4 
Paralegal Staff 5 
Paralegal Staff 6 
Paralegal Staff 7 
Paralegal Staff 8 
Offender 9 
Tasks 
• Request paralegal assistance, services, and 
resources using the applicable Access to Courts 
Request Form; and 
• Place the si ned form in the desi nated lock box. 
Note: If in need of the form, see a paralegal ( or other 
facility head-designated staff member per section 15 of th is 
SOP). The form comes in English and Spanish. 
Gather the access to courts request forms each business 
da . 
Send the requested resources (e.g., a form or qualified 
legal claim packet) to the offender using institutional mail 
(see SOP 402.02.01 .001, Mail Handling in Correctional 
F · r schedule a visit w ith the offender at the 
ter or other location. 
rovide the offender with the list of qualified 
kets see section 1 from which to choose. 
the Daily Book Check-out 
Courts database . 
If the offender requests assistance, h Ip the offender 
com lete authorized court filin s. 
Note: If the offender has a physical 
prepare or write the materials or do 
assistance, see section 8 of this S 
If the offender is illiterate in the 
• Arrange for an IDOC sta member, who speaks the 
offender's native language, to interpret; or 
• Arrange for another offender, who speaks the 
offender's native language, to interpret; or 
• Access the Language Line Services to provide 
interpretation. 
Com lete the claim for filin with the court. 
Note: To complete th is process, also see section 4 of this 
SOP. 
3. Authorized Photocopies 
Authorized photocopies include: 
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• Documents and all attachments allowed pursuant to this SOP that are ready to be 
filed with the court and opposing counsel, as requi red. 
• A completed Power of Attorney signed by the offender and notarized, if needed. 
Note: If there is a question regarding the documents or attachments, paralegal staff will 
determine what documents are necessary based on court rules or by contacting the court. 
Class Action and Multiple Offender Legal Actions 
When offenders jointly file documents and attachments with the court as co-plaintiffs 
(parties to the legal action) photocopies shall not be made for all parties to the legal 
action because a full photocopy must be maintained in the Resource Center. However, 
the offender who filed the legal action with the court will have the option of paying for 
one additional full hotocopy, which must be maintained as his personal copy. Upon 
request, all otaalil- to the legal action will be allowed to review the photocopy 
maintained · e Center. 
previous 
record of th 
If an offender who is a party t action is transferred to another facility , then a 
full photocopy of the initial fl quent filings can be made for that offender at 
his own expense. Howev meets the requirements to be considered 
indigent as defined in SO --==:-=--=--=:t•' Mail Handling in Correctional Facilities , a full 
photocopy can be made f upon his request at no expense to the offender. 
4. Mailing and Photocopying Court Documents a 
Photocopying privileges for offenders include th ditions: 
• Offenders (excluding indigent offend d a fee of ten cents ($.10) per 
• 
page for copies. 
Offenders (excluding indigent offenders) should use their ow 
fi lings; however, by necessity to meet a court filing deadline 
obtained through the Resource Center, offenders (excludin 
be charged the equivalent commissary price. 
• Page limitations on pleadings may be enforced in ace 
nvelopes for court 
envelopes are 
· enders) will 
Note: Mail sent to the Idaho Judicial Council , Idaho State Bar, or courts is not (by definition) 
legal mail and is therefore subject to search. However, paralegal staff shall still log mail sent 
to these entities on the Outgoing Legal Mail Log (located in the Access to Courts database). 
Procedure for Filing Pleadings and Other Documents with a Court 
Functional Roles and ' 
Responsibilities Step Tasks·, 
Offender 1 
Complete the documents, forms, or pleadings to be 
photocopied and mailed. 
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Functional Roles and 
Res onsibilities Ste 
Offender 2 
Paralegal Staff 3 
Paralegal Staff 
Paralegal Staff 
Paralegal Staff 
Paralegal Staff 7 
Paralegal Staff 8 
Tasks 
Submit to the paralegal staff the applicable Access to 
Courts Request Form for copies, notary (if needed), and 
mailin services. 
Note: If in need of the form, see a paralegal (or other 
facility head-designated staff member per section 15 of th is 
SOP). The form comes in English and Spanish. 
• Meet with the offender; and 
• Determine those documents authorized for 
hotoco in in accordance with this SOP. 
Notarize the documents that require a notary (if needed) . 
Photocopy the documents as required by court rules. 
Within two (2) business days of completing the request: 
• Complete an Offender Personal Funds Withdrawal 
Slip: and 
mail to the mailroom for 
5. Service of Documents Upon Opposing Parties 
Note: Service of a Summons and Complaint via mail does not con 
a state of Idaho court matter. 
Service on the /DOC, Idaho Board of Correction, Idaho Co 
Parole, or Any Employee Thereof 
te effective service in 
An offender shall neither attempt, nor cause another offender acting on his behalf to 
attempt to personally serve the IDOC, the Idaho Board of Correction, the Idaho 
Commission of Pardons and Parole, or any employee thereof, with any legal documents. 
Service on the IDOC, the Idaho Board of Correction, the Idaho Commission of Pardons 
and Parole, or any employee thereof, by an offender or member of the general public, 
shall be made by personal service upon a deputy attorneys general (DAG) who 
represents the I DOC. Service on any other person or entity shall be the sole 
responsibility of the offender. 
Note: Any service upon a DAG must (a) be in accordance with applicable court rules 
and (b) take place at Central Office. (See Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure [IRCPJ, rules 4 
[d] 2 and 4 [d] 5; Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 4; and Idaho Administrative 
Procedure Act [IDAPA] 06.01 .01 , section 106.) -.--·· ···-···--·--- ·------
• 
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Service on an Offender 
In General 
When an offender is served with a summons and complaint that is not a qualified legal 
claim (as described in section 1) and which requires a response per IRCP or Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, the offender shall be provided the opportunity to file a 
response. Paralegal staff shall provide mailing and photocopying services (see section 
1) that are consistent with court filing requirements . 
I Note: Paralegal assistance (see section 11) shall be limited to the initial response only. 
By an Outside Process Server 
Occasionally, an offender may be served with court documents regarding a civil action 
filed against the der. Federal and state of Idaho court rules provide for service to be 
conducted b process server who is 18 years of age or older and not a party 
to the cas recess server does not have to be law enforcement personnel 
If a victim 
IDOC victim 
Note: Due to significant sec 
into a facility to serve doc 
describe service of proce 
to courts coordinator shou 
development of the field m 
s about letting an outside process server come 
ility shall develop a field memorandum to 
t that facility. The Division of Prison's access 
to provide guidance to facility staff in the 
6. Access to Court Supplies for Indigent Offend 
Indigent status is defined in SOP 402.02.01 .0 in Correctional Facilities. If 
an offender does not meet the requirements defin considered indigent, the 
paralegal ( or other facility head-designated staff membe er section 15) shall ensure the 
offender has the ability to access the courts in accordance with this P. This may include 
providing the offender with indigent supplies, photocopying docume for the offender, or 
providing postage, if necessary. For example, if an offender has on ollar a d twenty cents 
($1.20) in his Offender Trust Account and needs to make 30 photo · otiof! and 
mail it to the court to be filed , the paralegal (or other facility hea signated staff member 
per section 15) shall accommodate the request even though t ffender does not have 
enough money in his account to cover the fu ll expense of photocopying and mailing the 
motion. 
Indigent supplies include the following : 
• Blank paper for preparing court filings (no more than 25 sheets in an offender's 
possession at any time). 
Note: Indigent offenders should use preprinted forms if available. The blank sheets 
of paper must have the facility name and the terms 'indigent legal paper' printed in 
the bottom left corner of at least one side of the paper to identify it as paper that has 
been authorized for legal work. 
• Envelopes for mailing at the time of filing or to a verifiable attorney of record. 
• One security pen (black ink only) on an exchange basis. 
• 
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Note: The sufficient amount of postage required to mail authorized legal documents for filing 
shall be affixed to the envelope (see SOP 402.02.01 .001, Mail Handling in Correctional 
Facilities). 
Procedure to Obtain Indigent Supplies 
Functional Roles and 
Res onsibilities Ste 
Offender 1 
Paralegal Staff 
Paralegal Staff 
Paralegal Staff 
Note: If the offender is misusin 
head (or designee) may limit 
issued. 
Tasks 
Request indigent supplies using the applicable Access to 
Courts Re uest Form. 
Note: If in need of the form, see a paralegal (or other 
facility head-designated staff member per section 15 of th is 
SOP). The form comes in English and Spanish. 
Determine what indigent supplies are needed. 
By individual items, enter the indigent supplies in the 
Resource Center Indigent Offender Supplies Log and 
Access to Courts database. 
Issue the indigent supplies to the offender. 
e indigent supplies issued to him, the facility 
igent supplies the offender has on hand or is 
7. Offenders Who are Unable to e Forms 
An offender who believes he needs help completi legal claim forms may: 
• In accordance with SOP 402.02.01 .00 . in Correctional Facilities, and 
directive 503.02 .01 .001, Offender 7i one ng and Recording, directly 
contact an attorney and seek representation at offender' 
• Complete a Motion and Affidavit in Support for Appointment 
• Request assistance from paralegal staff (see section 2 andl 
8. Offender-to-Offender Assistance 
Offenders may assist one another with legal work under the following guidelines: 
• Both offenders must live in the same housing unit and have access to one another 
during normal facility operations. 
• The assisting offender cannot (a) work on the legal material alone, (b) be in 
possession of the other offender's legal materials, or (c) prepare or write the other 
offender's materials and documents unless the offender is unable to prepare or write 
them due to being illiterate in the English language or due to a physical disability. 
• An offender shall not receive any item or service for helping another offender with 
legal work. 
• An offender shall not represent another person in any legal proceeding. 
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When affidavits are complete, the affidavits and copies of attachments becomes the 
property of the offender filing the claim. (The attachments that have the original 
signature will be returned to the offender providing the affidavit.) 
When necessary, due to custody level ; housing; or facility, paralegal staff will help 
offenders wit ss of obtaining affidavits. To eliminate questions regarding the 
affidavit pro wing information must be obtained before the process begins: 
• Th ress of the offender filing the document; 
• Th urt in which the case is pending or will be filed; 
• The na ting to the information in the affidavit; and 
• The case number if 
After the information not ed, the affidavit can be given to the offender 
attesting to the informatio ttesting to the information can write the 
affidavit or sign the docum · the der filing the document wrote the information. If 
the offender attesting to the affliilliiiiHs in another · ity, the paralegal staff will facilitate 
the process. 
9. Right to Retain Counsel 
This SOP is not intended to interfere with an offender's 
10. Supervision of Paralegal Staff 
f paralegal 
eputy ward'en. The 
ccess to courts 
The facility head will designate a deputy warden to provide direct s 
staff. Paralegal staff will address operational issues with the desi 
paralegal or deputy warden may contact the Division of Prisa ' 
coordinator regarding operational issues. 
The chief of the Division of Prisons (or designee) will designate a division access to courts 
coordinator. 
The Division of Prison's access to courts coordinator will report directly to the chief of the 
Division of Prisons (or designee) and be responsible for the following: 
• Responding to any request that is not authorized pursuant to this SOP (also see the 
note box in section 1); 
• Scheduling and coordinating paralegal meetings; 
• Identifying training needs and agenda items for the meeting; 
• Facilitating the meeting; 
• 
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• Providing guidance to paralegal staff, facility staff, and IDOC administration 
regarding access to courts issues; 
• Requesting clarification from the DAG's Office (who represents the IDOC) regarding 
access to courts issues; 
• Requesting clarification of policy and SOP issues from the !DOC policy coordinator 
or Division of Prison's policy coordinator, as applicable (both coordinators are 
located at Central Office); and 
• Maintaining and issuing the password to the password protected Access to Courts 
Manual only to those deemed as having a need to know, such as paralegals and 
attorneys. 
11. Duties of Parale 
The I DOC shal 
Paralegal duti · 
• 
gal staff to assist offenders with qualified legal claims. 
!lowing: 
• ••1ers with I DOC-authorized legal resources. 
• Providing offenders with 
• Providing notary servi 
• Providing or securing 
offenders seeking assi 
es for non-English speaking and special needs 
tial pleadings for qualified legal claims. 
• Maintaining the following logs and forms in t 
• Daily Book Check-out Log (Locat s to Courts database.) 
• Individual Activity Log (Locate Courts database.) 
• Notary Services Log (Note: Notary logs are the prope of the notaries.) 
• Outgoing Legal Mail Log (Located in the Access to C s database.) 
• Resource Center Attorney Telephone Call Request F 
• Resource Center Copies Log 
• Resource Center Indigent Offender Supplies Log 
• Resource Center Request to Store Excess Legal Materials Form 
A paralegal will not: 
• Assist offenders to file any claim that is beyond the scope of this SOP. 
• Offer legal advice. (Note: Assistance with grammar, spelling, or other matters not of 
a legal consequence shall not be considered offering legal advice.) 
• Represent an offender. 
• Refer offenders to attorneys or attorneys to offenders. 
• Make unauthorized changes to Access to Courts Manual forms or packets. 
• Schedule appointments for offenders to meet with each other. 
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• Issue the password to the password protected Access to Courts Manual to any other 
persons_ 
12.LegalResources 
As described in table 15-1, Resource Centers will maintain the publications, forms, and 
packets listed in the Access to Courts Manual and make them available to the facilities they 
service. 
Facility staff may not purchase additional items or create additional forms without the written 
approval of the director of IDOC (or designee). 
Resources may be used in the Resource Center or checked out as approved by paralegal 
staff. 
The IDOC does n 
additional rese 
received throu 
Correctional 
Functional Roles-and 
Res onsibilities 
Facility Head 
Offender 
Paralegal Staff 
Paralegal Staff 
Paralegal Staff (or 
Desi nee 
Paralegal Staff 
Offender 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
for extensive or generalized legal research . If an offender wants 
not available in the Resource Center, the materials may be 
cordance with SOP 402.02.01 .001, Mail Handling in 
hotocopy of the court order or 
urs prior to the telephone 
de available at the 
Log the call using the Individual 
Access to Courts database . 
Participate in the telephone hearing. 
Note: If the offender fails to provide 24 hour notice to the !DOC, a paralegal staff will still 
facilitate the call , if possible. 
Table 13-2: Attorney Telephone Calls 
Offenders can place unmonitored telephone calls to their attorneys using the offender 
telephone system (see directive 503.02.01 .001, Offender Telephone Monitoring and 
Recording). If an offender is unable to place a direct telephone call to his attorney using 
the offender telephone system, the offender may then (a) contact the attorney via mail 
(in accordance with SOP 402.02.01 .001, Mail Handling in Correctional Facilities) and 
request that the attorney place a telephone call to facility paralegal staff and askthem-to -
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arrange a telephone call from the offender to the attorney or (b) simply just correspond 
with the attorney via mail. 
Occasionally an attorney may have difficulty making contact with an offender because of 
schedule conflicts or due to the offender's inability to access the telephone at a specific 
time. If an attorney or attorney's agent contacts the paralegal requesting to talk to an 
offender, and the paralegal determines the normal process outlined in directive 
503.02.01.001 , Offender Telephone Monitoring and Recording, will not work, the 
paralegal will use the following process steps: 
· Functional Roles and 
Res onsibilities 
Attorney (or 
Attorney's Agent) 
Paralegal Staff 
Paralegal Staff 
Offender 
14. Forms for Qualified Legal C 
Tasks 
Contact the paralegal staff; and 
Re uest an attorne tele hone call with the offender. 
Log the request using the Individual Activity Log (located in 
the Access to Courts database. 
Prepare a Resource Center Attorney Telephone Call 
Request Form to forward to the offender with the name of 
the attorney, the telephone number to call, and the date 
· e attorne tele hone call is to be laced. 
rney telephone call. 
Authorized forms for qualified I a=m~ e maintained in the Access to Courts Manual. 
Only paralegal staff and designe access tot nual (see section 10 for further 
details). The Access to Courts Manual table of co the authorized materials. 
Prohibited Forms 
Offenders must not draft or possess the lowing. 
• Completed or blank transport orders; and 
• Blank letterhead stationery (of any kind). 
15. Access to Courts Procedures for Facilities without a Resou 
Offenders housed at St. Anthony Work Camp (SAWC), North ' o Correctional Institution 
(NICI), South Boise Women's Correctional Center (SBWCC), or a CWC will use the 
appropriate Resource Center listed in table15-1 to provide offenders access to court 
services. The Division of Prison's access to courts coordinator may also be contacted to 
provide services. The facility head (or designee) will designate a facility staff member to help 
offenders with general, day-to-day operational issues regarding access to courts matters. 
The Division of Prison 's access to courts coordinator can make temporary (up to 60 days) 
reassignments of this reporting structure to accommodate training or staff shortages. The 
assigned paralegal staff member at the facility that has a Resource Center shall visit (as 
needed, but at least once a month) the facility served that does not have a Resource Center 
(see the following table). 
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Facili Served · .. • 
Idaho Correctional Institution Orofino (ICIO) • ICIO 
• NICI 
• East Boise ewe 
• Nampa ewe 
South Idaho Correctional Institution (SICI) • SBWeC 
Pocatello Women's C 
(PWCC) 
Table 15-2: 
Center 
.Fllnctiori~t.Rol~ an 
.. Res . onsibilities// 
Offender 
Facility Head (or 
Designee) 
Paralegal 
Facility Head (or 
Designee) 
1 
2 
3 
4 
• SICI 
• sIeI ewe 
• Idaho Falls ewe 
• PWCe 
• SAWe 
or Offenders Housed at Facilities without a Resource 
• 
• 
• Ensure the offender recei 
resources; and 
which services or 
(located in 
• Document in the Corrections Integrated System 
(CIS), using the contact sheets, when the offender 
receives the services or resources. 
For further assistance with CIS, see your designated CIS super user. 
16. Storage of Excess Legal Materials 
Each facility head will identify a secure area for storing an offender's excess legal materials. 
The I DOC will store legal materials related to active and ongoing litigation that cannot be 
contained in an offender's authorized personal property. The amount of storage space 
needed will be taken into consideration when storing an offender's legal materials that are 
referenced in the offender's active and ongoing litigation. · 
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The IDOC will not store case law that is not specifically and directly related to an active and 
ongoing case, excess legal materials, multiple copies of pleadings, research materials, or 
materials not directly related to the offender's active and ongoing litigation. 
Legal materials remaining after the offender has been released will be disposed of in 
accordance with SOP 320.02.01 .001, Property: State-issued and Offender Personal 
Property. If the offender has paroled, any legal material he left at the facility shall be 
forwarded to the offender's new address and documented in the Corrections Integrated 
System (CIS) in accordance with SOP 320.02.01 .001. 
On an annual basis, paralegal staff (with the offender present) will review stored excess 
legal materials. If the offender cannot be present, paralegal staff will document the reason 
why using the Individual Activity Log (located in the Access to Courts database. 
Note: Each facility shall develop a field memorandum to describe the process for offenders 
to store and retri cess legal materials, and a process to inventory the material. 
The Division of s to courts coordinator should be contacted to provide 
guidance to f development of the field memorandum. 
Process Step 
For the purpo51!111...,rn is SOP onl ' 
Center or another part of th 
ure storage' shall mean an area in a Resource 
at can be locked, and (b) where offenders and 
unauthorized staff do not h 
Offender 1 
Housing Unit Staff 2 
• 
taff for verification. 
e a paralegal ( or other 
membe per section 15 of this 
in excess of the 
apers and 
.01 .001, 
Verify that the legal materials a 
allowable three (3) cubic feet o 
legal materials allowable per 
Property: State-issued an ender Personal 
Property; and 
• Complete the submitted Resource Center Request to 
Store Excess Legal Materials Form and return it to the 
offender. 
• 
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•. Fi.mcti6nal Roles ~~d .. ·.· 
· Res ·· onsibilities .· .. ·. · Ste 
Offender 
Paralegal Staff (or 
Designee) 
Paralegal Staff ( or 
Designee) 
Paralegal Staff (or 
Designee) 
and 
Offender 
Paralegal Staff (or 
Designee) 
and 
Offender 
Paralegal Staff ( or 
Desi nee 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
Tasks. 
Submit the completed Resource Center Request to Store 
Excess Legal Materials Form to paralegal staff (or other 
facility head-designated staff member per section 15 of th is 
SOP . 
Note: If there are no case numbers, titles , court 
information , or required signatures on the form, paralegal 
staff ( or the facility head-designated staff member) will 
return the form to you and the process will end here. 
Note: If needed, the paralegal staff (or facility head-
designated staff member) will provide you with a box to 
store your excess legal materials. However, if you want to 
organize your excess legal materials when storing them, it 
shall be your responsibility to purchase organizing 
materials (e.g., file folders and manila envelopes) from the 
commissary and organize your excess legal materials prior 
to storing them. 
Ve · numbers, titles, court information, and whether 
atures are provided. 
rmation is not submitted - return the form to 
er and end the process here until the 
information is submitted; or 
information · ubmitted - roceed to ste 5. 
Inform the offender bring the excess legal 
materials to the ,.=...=.:...,ae_lo_c_a_tio_n_. _ _ _____ --i 
Note: If need ender with a box to store his 
excess lega teria offender wants to organize his 
excess legal materials be ore storing em, it shall be the 
offender's responsibility to purchase ganizing materials 
(e.g., file folders and manila envelo ) from the 
commissary and organize his exce legal terials prior 
to being allowed to store them. 
In accordance with section 20 
320.02.01 .001 , Property: Stat 
Personal Property: 
• Search the excess legal material for unauthorized 
items; and 
• Dispose of the unauthorized items in accordance with 
SOP 320.02.0 1 .001. 
Clearly mark and identify each file folder or manila 
envelope with numbers and letters. (E.g., Box 2, File 3.) 
Create an inventory sheet for documenting and tracking.the- . 
excess le al materials. 
• 
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17. Record Retention 
Paralegal staff will retain copies of access to court forms, attachments, and other logs and 
documentation identified in this SOP as follows : five (5) years for paper and seven (7) for 
electronic records. 
18. Attorney Visits 
Attorney visits are explained in SOP 604.02.01 .001, Visiting. 
19. Confidential Mail 
All indigent confidential mail shall be processed in accordance with SOP 402.02.01 .001, 
Mail Handling in Correctional Facilities. 
20. Searching Legal Material 
rch of offenders' legal material can be found in SOP 
I/Living Unit, and Offender. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DIS~~~-K-~ 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF GOODING 
ROBERT JOHNSON, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO , 
Respondent. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) Case No. CV-2013-84 
) 
) 
) 
) 
______________ ) 
JUDGMENT OF DISMISSAL 
The court having entered a Notice of Intent to Dismiss and after having received and 
considered the Petitioner's Response, the court entered its Memorandum Decision Re: Notice of 
Intent to Dismiss, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED, that the Petitioner's Second 
Successive Petition for Post-Conviction Relief is hereby DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DA TED this ~~--_ day of ,--:;: L '{ 
l - JUDGMENT OF DISMISSAL 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING/DELIVERY 
l, undersigned, hereby certify that on the .,:5 I day of ~ , 2013 a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing JUDGMENT OF DISMISSALas mailed, postage paid, and/or 
hand-delivered to the following persons: 
Robert Terry Johnson 
IDOC # 27073 
ICC- I 219 B 
P.O. Box 70010 
Boise, Idaho 83707 
Gooding County Prosecutor 
P.O. Box 86 
Gooding, Idaho 83330 
Steven R. McRae 
McRae Law Office, PLLC 
161 5th Ave. South, Ste. 100 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF 
IDAHO. IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF GOODING 
ROBERT JOHNSON, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Case No. CV-2013-84 
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 
AND REQUEST FOR OPPORTUNITY 
TO RESPOND LR.C.P. 11(a)(2), I.e. § 
19-4906(b) 
COMES NOW, Petitioner, Robert Johnson, by and through his attorney of record, Steven 
R McRae of McRae Law Office. PLLC, and files this Motion for Reconsideration pursuant to 
I.R.C.P. 1 l(a)(2) and Idaho Code § 19-4906(b). Specifically, Petitioner asks for twenty (20) 
days to respond to new factual assertions, analysis and legal conclusions as contained in the 
Court>s Memorandum Decision re: Notice of Intent to Dismiss as filed on March 12, 2013 (the 
.. Memorandum Decision") that were not contained in the Notice of Intent to Dismiss filed on July 
31, 2013. Oral Argument is requested on this matter. 
PBTiiION'Ell'S REPLY TO NOTICE OF INTENT TO DISMISS - l -
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ARGUMENT 
Pursuant to Idaho Code § 19-4906(b), a Court can, by its own volition. dismiss a post-
conviction petition. However, in order to do so, the Court must grant the post~conviction 
petitioner "an opportunity to reply within 20 days to the proposed dismissal." Id. 
In Gibbs v. State, 103 Idaho 758, 653 P.2d 813 (Ct. App. 1982). the Idaho Court of 
Appeals further considered the application of Idaho Code § I 9-4906(b ). In Gibbs, Gibbs filed a 
petition for post-conviction relief. Id. at 759, 653 P.2d at 814 (Ct. App. 1982). The State moved 
to dismiss the petition on the sole ground that it was not timely filed under Idaho Code § 19-
4902. Id. The District Court granted the motion to dismiss; however. the Court based its 
decision not on the question for timeliness, but on the merits of Gibbs' application. Id. The 
Idaho Court of Appeals held that the dismissal by the District Court was inappropriate. as the 
petitioner was not given the requisite.twenty (20) days' notice as required by Idaho Code § 19~ 
4906(b ). Id. at 760, 653 P .2d at 815 (Ct. App. 1982). The Court held, .. For Gibbs to have had a 
chance to argue the point which detennined the outcome of the case, it was necessary for the 
district court to comply with the notice requirement. Tlie obvious purpose of the notice 
requirement of LC. § 19-4906{b) is to ensure that a petitioner will have the opportuni'ty to 
challenge an adverse decision before it becomes fmaJ:· Id. (Emphasis added). 
In the present matter, Petitioner is asking for a twenty (20) day period so as to answer 
newly asserted factual allegations and legal grounds as contained in the Memorandum Decision 
to dismiss Petitioner's Petition and Affidavit for 2nd Successive Post-Conviction Relief. 
Specificallyt Petitioner requests the opportunity to research and respond to the following: 
a. The Court states that petitioner's factual allegations are "bare and conclusory". 
See Memorandum Decision at 11-12. Petitioner seeks the opportunity to research respond to this 
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legal reasoning and conclusion, which was not contained in the Court's Notice of Intent to 
Dismiss. 
b. The Court states, "The ignorance of a person of his or her right to bring an action 
does not excuse the petitioner from filing a successive petition within a reasonable period of time 
from discovery of the alleged Brady violation." Memorandum Decision at 11. Petitioner seeks 
the opportunity to research and respond to this legal conclusion, which was not contained in the 
Court's Notice of Intent to Dismiss. 
c. The Court references IDAPA No. 405. Policy Control No. 405.02.01.001 and 
draws several inferences from the same. See Memorandum Decision at 9ul3. Petitioner seeks 
the opportunity to research and respond to the inferences and conclusions as have been drawn. by 
the Court from the IDAP A in arguing that he filed his original post-conviction petition within a 
''reasonable time''. as the Court's inferences, analysis and conclusions were not contained in the 
Court's Notice of Intent to Dismiss. 
d. The Court makes other inferences based upon the factual record (not based upon 
the above-cited IDAP A). See Memorandum Decision at 11 (that because Petitioner stated that he 
has time limits, that he must have ••obtained some information or knowledge from the legal 
resource center or from his prior post-conviction experience") and (that Petitioner ''had to know 
that he could not pay for the advice of an attorney"); and at 13 (that "[i]t is not reasonable for the 
petition to believe he could hire an attorney on his own ... "). (that "he knew or should have 
known that he could have requested appointment of counsel at the time of filing a post-
conviction relief petition, [sic] from his prior experience."), (that "[t]he petitioner had prior 
knowledge of post-conviction relief proceedings."), and (that Petitioner knew there were time 
limits for filing a petition for post-conviction relief). Petitioner seeks the opportunity to research 
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and respond to the inferences and conclusions as have been drawn by the Court in arguing that 
he filed his original post-conviction petition within a "reasonable time", as the Court's 
inferences, analysis and conclusions were not contained in the Court's Nottce of Intent to 
Dismiss. 
e. The Court states, ''Further, the conduct of appellate counsel on post-conviction 
appeals is not grounds for relief" Memorandum Decision at 14. The Court also sets forth an 
apparent argument that Petitioner could not prove prejudice in his claims against his appellate 
counsel in stating, "Further, even if appellate counsel had properly raised on appeal the extension 
of Pizutto, for purposes of the petition for review, it is pure speculation that the Idaho Supreme 
Court would have extended the reasoning in Pizutto to noncapital cases." Id. Petitioner seeks 
the opportunity to research and respond to these legal analysis and conclusions, which were not 
contained in the Court's Notice of Intent to Dismiss. 
f. The Court finally concludes that the doctrines of ''law of the case" and res 
judicata bar Petitioner's claim. Given the full legal analysis of the Memorandum Decision, 
Petitioner seeks the opportunity to respond to the Court's conclusion. Petitioner acknowledges 
that the Court gave notice of the intent to dismiss based upon these two legal decisions in the 
Court· s Notice of Intent to Dismiss; however, Petitioner asserts that the legal basis and reasoning 
for concluding the same as set forth in the Memorandum Decision is now substantially different. 
Therefore, Petitioner seeks the opportunity to research and respond to the Court's conclusion. 
Petitioner has not had the opportunity to respond or in any way answer any of the 
foregoing factual assertions, analysis or legal conclusions of the Court. Pursuant to Idaho Code 
§ l 9-4906(b ), Petitioner simply asks that he be given twenty (20) days to have the ability to 
research and answer the same and thereby have "a chance to argue the point(s) which determine 
PETITIONER'S REPLY TO NOTICE OF INTENT TO DISMISS - 4 -
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the outcome of (Petitioner's] case" and "have the opportunity to challenge an adverse decision 
before it becomes final". Gibbs. at 760, 653 P.2d at 815 (Ct App. 1982). 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons. Petitioner requests that the Court, pursuant to Idaho Code § 
19-4906 grants Petitioner a period of twenty (20) days to respond to the Court's new factual 
assertions, analysis and legal conclusions as contained in the Memorandum Decision re: Notice 
of Intent to Dismiss. Oral Argument is requested on this matter. 
DATED this 14th day of August, 2013. 
McRAE LAW OFFICE, PLLC 
By:~ 
Steven R. McRae 
Attorney for Petitioner 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 14th day of August, 2013, I served a true and correct 
copy of the within and foregoing document upon the following: 
Gooding County Prosecutor 
P.O. Box 86 
Gooding. ID 83330 
Fax: (208) 934-4494 
[ ] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand-Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ x ] Facsimile 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF GOODING 
ROBERT JOHNSON, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
ST A TE OF IDAHO , 
Respondent. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) Case No. CV-2013-84 
) 
) 
) 
) 
______________ ) 
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 
On July 31, 2013 the Court entered its Memorandum Decision Re: Notice of Intent to 
Dismiss and Judgment of Dismissal as to the petitioner's Second Successive Petition for Post-
Conviction Relief. 
On August 14, 2013 counsel for the petitioner filed his Motion for Reconsideration. The 
petitioner seeks reconsideration based on Gibbs v. State, 103 Idaho 758, 653 P.2d 813 (Ct. App. 
1982). The court gave notice to the petitioner in the Court's Notice of Intent to Dismiss that the 
issue of timeliness of the claims asserted in his first successive petition were finally determined 
by the Idaho Court of Appeals and that it was the burden of the petitioner to provide a "sufficient 
reason" to support a second successive petition for post-conviction relief. The petitioner was put 
on notice that it was his burden to present those facts that he allegedly provided to his previously 
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appointed post-conviction that would have established the timeliness of his first successive 
petition. 
The court provided sufficient notice to the petitioner that he had the burden to establish a 
sufficient reason to support his second successive petition for post-conviction relief. The can be 
no dispute that the court's grounds upon which summary disposition is based must be stated. 
I.R.C.P. 7(b)(l); DeRushe v. State, 146 Idaho 599,601,200 P.3d 1148, 1150 (2009); LC.§ 19-
4906(b ). In DeRushe, the Court retreated from a series of cases that required a high level of 
detail and specificity regarding the asserted deficiencies in the petitioner's claims in order to be 
considered adequate notice. The Court stated that "The particularity requirement of Rule 7(b)(l) 
does not mandate that level of detail. The Rule only requires reasonable particularity. If the 
notice is sufficient that the other party cannot assert surprise or prejudice, the requirement is 
met." DeRushe v. State, 146 Idaho 599, 601, 200 P.3d 1148, 1150 (2009) (internal citations 
omitted). In Kelly v. State, 149 Idaho 517, 236 P.3d 1277 (2010), the Court held that the State's 
motion for summary disposition stating simply that Kelly "has no evidentiary basis to support his 
claims, Small v. State, 132 Idaho 327, 331, 971 P.2d 1151, 1155 (Ct. App. 1998)" was adequate 
notice to place the question of the sufficiency of Kelly's evidentiary support for all of his claims 
at issue. Kelly v. State, 149 Idaho 517, 522, 236 P .3d 1277, 1282 (2010). 
The petitioner alleged that the determination that his first successive petition was 
untimely was for the reason that his prior post-conviction counsel had failed to provide to the 
court "facts" on the issue of timeliness of his successive petition. Petitioner claimed to have 
disclosed such "facts" to his prior post-conviction counsel and that such counsel failed to use 
such facts to support the timeliness of his successive petition. The petitioner presented to the 
court the alleged facts, and this court concluded that such "facts" were nothing more than-bare 
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conclusions or general allegations. In the absence of a "sufficient reason" for the second 
petition for post-conviction relief, the petition is barred by reason of res judicata 
and/or the doctrine of the law of the case. The legal conclusions of the court are not the relevant 
consideration of the sufficiency of the notice for purposes of summary dismissal. The petitioner 
had sufficient notice of the grounds upon which his second successive petition was dismissed. 
CONCLUSION AND ORDER 
For the reasons set forth above, the Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DATED this ~J--l day of __ ~~--
John K. Butler( 
- ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 326 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING/DELIVERY 
undersigned, hereby certify that on the ~__;2 day of ~ , 2013 a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing ORDER DENYING MOTI0N0RRECONSIDERATION was 
mailed, postage paid, and/or hand-delivered to the following persons: 
Robert Terry Johnson 
IDOC # 27073 
ICC- I 219 B 
P.O. Box 70010 
Boise, Idaho 83 707 
Gooding County Prosecutor 
P.O. Box 86 
Gooding, Idaho 83330 
Steven R. McRae 
McRae Law Office, PLLC 
161 5th Ave. South, Ste. 100 
P.O. Box 1233 
Twin Falls, Idaho 83303 
Deputy Clerk 
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McRAE LAW OFFICE, PLLC 
P.O, Box 1233 
Twin Falls. ID 83303-1233 
Telephone No. (208) 944-0755 
Facsimile No. (208) 736-0041 
e-mail: SMcRae@Magic Valley Legal.com 
Attorney for Petitioner 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF 
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF GOODING 
ROBERT JOHNSON, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO. 
Respondent. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
_____________ ,) 
Case No. CV-2013-84 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
TO: THE ABOVE-NAMED RESPONDENT. STATE OF IDAHO. AND ITS 
ATTORNEY OF RECORD, JOHN HORGAN, AND THE CLERK OF THE 
ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT. 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. The above-named appellant, Robert Johnson, appeals against the above-named 
respondent to the Idaho Supreme Court from the Memorandum Decision Re: Notice of Intent to 
Dismiss entered July 31, 2013, the Order Denying Motion for Reconsideration entered on 
August 27. 2013. and the Judgment of Dismissal entered on July 31~ 2013, Honorable John K. 
Butler presiding. 
2. The party has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court and the Orders 
described in Paragraph l above are appealable Orders under and pursuant to I.A.R. 11 (a)(l) and 
(7). 
Notice of Appeal 
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3. Preliminary Statement of the Issue on Ap_geal. That the issues on appeal will 
include all issues as contained and addressed in the Memorandum Decision Re: Notice of Intent 
to Dismiss, the Order Denying Motion for Reconsideration, and other issues to be determined at 
a later date. 
4. The Appellant requests the following documents to be included in the Clerk's 
record, in addition to those autornatically included under I.A.R 28: 
a. Petition and Affidavit for 2nd Successive Post Conviction Relief filed on 
February 14, 2013; 
b. Notice of Intent to Dismiss filed on March 12, 2013; 
c. Petitioner' s Reply to Notice of Intent to Dismiss filed July 3, 2013; 
d. Partial Supplemental Affidavit of Robert Johnson filed July 3, 2013; 
e. Affidavit of Robert Richard Jones filed July 3, 2013; 
f. Affidavit of Erik R. Lehtinen filed July 3, 2013; 
g. Memorandum Decision Re: Notice oflntent to Dismiss entered July 31, 
2013; 
h. Judgment of Dismissal filed July 31, 2013; 
i. Motion for Reconsideration and Request for Opportunity to Respond 
I.R.C.P. l l(a)(2), I.C. § 19-4906(b) filed August 14, 2013; 
j. Order Denyuig Motion for Reconsideration entered on August 27, 2013; 
and 
k. The Register of Actions in this matter. 
5. I certify: 
(a) That the Appellant is exempt from paying the estimated fee for the 
preparation of the Clerk's record because he is incarcerated and is indigent; 
(b) That the Appellant is exempt from paying the appellate filing fee because 
he is incarcerated and is indigent; 
( c) That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant 
to Rule 20 I.A.R. and the Attorney General ofldaho. 
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DATED THIS "l~ay of )~\)...v' • 2013. 
~ Steven R. McRa.e 
Attorney for Petitioner 
CERTIFICATEt 0.1. ,SER~ . 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this ~day of ~~@OJ\, • 2013. I served a 
true and correct copy of the within and foregoing document up~ the attomey(s) or petson{s) 
named below in the manner noted: 
Gooding County Prosecutor 
P.O. Box86 
Gooding, ID 83330 
Fax: (208) 934-4494 
Clerk of the Idaho Supreme Court 
P .0. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720 
Attorney General's Office 
P .0. Box 83720, Room 210 
Boise, Idaho 83 720 
Office of the State Appellate 
Public Defender 
3647 Lake Harbor Lane 
Boise, Idaho 83 706 
Gooding County Courthouse 
P.O. Box417 
Gooding, ID 83330 
Fax: (208) 934-4408 
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EXHIBIT LIST 
EXHIBIT LIST 
Johnson v State 
Gooding County Case #CV 2013-000084 
Supreme Court Case #41414-2013 
(No Exhibits offered or admitted) 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF GOODING 
ROBERT JOHNSON, 
Petitioner/ Appellant, 
vs. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Supreme Court No. t/1 tf IV 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
___________ ) 
I, Cynthia R. Eagle-Ervin, Deputy Clerk of the District Court of the Fifth 
Judicial District, of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Gooding, do hereby 
certify that the above and foregoing Record in the above entitled cause was compiled 
and bound under my direction as, and is a true, full and correct Record of the pleadings 
and documents as are automatically required under Rule 28 of the Idaho Appellate 
Rules. 
I, do further certify that there were no exhibits offered or admitted and 
no hearings held in this matter so there are no Court Reporter's Transcripts to be 
lodged with the Clerk's Record as required by Rule 31 of the Idaho Appellate Rules. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the 
said Court this 28 day of October, 2013. 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE 
Clerk of the District Court 
By:,ft:f-k 
Cynthia1R. 6t{gle-Ervin 
Deputy 'trerk · 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF GOODING 
ROBERT JOHNSON, 
Petitioner/ Appellant, 
vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
*************** 
) 
) 
) Supreme Court No. 41414-2013 
) 
) CERRIFIACTE OF SERVICEL 
) 
) 
) 
I, Cynthia Eagle-Ervin, Deputy Clerk of the District Court of the Fifth Judicial 
District of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Gooding, do hereby certify that I 
have personally served or mailed, by United States mail, one copy of the Clerk's Record 
and any exhibits offered or admitted to each of the Attorneys of Record in this case as 
follows: 
Sara Thomas 
State Appellate Public Defender 
P.O. Box 83720 
BOISE, ID 83720 
Lawrence Wasden 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
STATEHOUSE MAIL, RM 210 
BOISE, IDAHO 83720 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of 
said Court this 1st day of November, 2013. 
CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT·· 
By:~~ 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
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